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WHENCE AND WHITHER

AN INQUIRY INTO

THE NATURE OF THE SOUL, ITS ORIGIN AND ITS DESTINY

BY

DR. PAUL CARUS

SECOND EDITION

"FOR WHAT IS A MAN PROFITED, IF HE SHALL GAIN THE WHOLE WORLD AND LOSE HIS OWN SOUL?"

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PREFACE.

SOME psychologists of the modern school have characterised their science as a "psychology without a soul." They mean thereby that the old dualistic conception of the soul as a metaphysical ego-being, with faculties and functions, has been discarded; that there is no such thing as a soul-entity; and that, accordingly, our psychology must be reconstructed, pretty much after the manner in which we might reconstruct the play of "Hamlet" with the rôle of Hamlet omitted. The author of this little book is fully aware of the gravity of the charges that have been made against the old-fashioned soul-conception; in fact, he himself is one of the most energetic supporters of the monistic philosophy, but he would insist that, while a deeper insight into the nature of things necessitates a revision of our science, the facts of man's soul-life remain the same as before, and the new psychology is not a psychology without a soul, but a psychology with a new interpretation of the soul.

The soul, it is true, can no longer he regarded as

a mystical being, as an entity, or an essence,—a something in itself, possessed of certain qualities and endowed with faculties: the soul is not that which feels and thinks and acts, but is the feeling itself, the thinking itself, and the acting itself; and the faculties, so called, are simply various categories under which the several sets of psychical functions may be subsumed.

There is as little need for the psychologist to assume a separate soul-being, performing the several soul-functions, as there is for the meteorologist to assume a wind-entity, which, by blowing, produces a commotion in the air. According to the positive school, the commotion in the air itself is the wind. But though we deny the existence of a metaphysical wind-entity, winds blow as vigorously as they ever did; and why should the soul of the new psychology be less real than the soul of the old psychology?

The dualistic conceptions of thing-in-themselves, which are supposed to be the agents of phenomena, constituting the concrete things, is gone forever; and some thinkers to whom this conception of the world has grown dear, feel sad at heart and sigh over the loss of their spiritual treasures, for they fancy that the highest ideals of mankind have been impaired, and science is doomed to end in dreary nihilism. But let us remember, that, if *things-in-themselves* have no real existence, the *things themselves* remain. If the metaphysical soul-conception must be abandoned, the facts of our soul-life remain.

The personality of man, so little understood before, is not of less significance, if we can analyse it and trace the fibres which enter into the wonderful system of its make-up; and the unity of the soul is not gone, because man's psychical activity is not a rigid unit, not an atom, not a monad. The soul is a complex organism, consisting of many ingredients and different parts with varied functions. It is a compound, but, being an organism, it does not lack unity. It is subject to change, but for that very reason it is capable of growth, of expansion, of advancement, and elevation.

The main fact of man's psychical activity is the continuity of his soul, for this is the ultimate basis for the identity of a man's personality through all the changes of his development. The continuity and identity of each soul are conditions which beget the feeling of responsibility, and thus force upon man the necessity of moral conduct.

The first questions of psychology are the *Whence* and *Whither* of the human soul; and we must understand their significance in order to be able to answer the main question of life, "What shall we do? How shall we act? Which aim shall we pursue?"

The continuity of man's soul-life is not limited to the span of time that lies between birth and death; it extends beyond the boundary line of individual existence, and links the fate of each single person to the lives of his ancestors and contemporaries, as well as to the generations to come.

It is not impossible to comprehend the nature of man's soul, to trace its *Whence*, and to point out its *Whither*; and we trust that when a man has gained an insight into the relation of his own being to the general life of the race, he will think with greater reverence of the past and with more consideration for the future. It will make him judicious in whatever he undertakes, and will serve him as a mariner's compass on his journey over the stormy ocean of time.

THE AUTHOR.

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THE NATURE OF THE SOUL.

THE PROBLEM.

THE Sphinx that threatens to destroy the wanderer on his pilgrimage through life is the problem of man,—the problem of the human soul, its nature, its origin, and its destiny,—a problem which must be solved on penalty of perdition. Does the problem lie within the ken of human comprehension, or must we surrender all hope of ever attaining, even in broad outlines, the proper solution?

Heinrich Heine, the poet of sentimental world-pain, tersely portrays in a few characteristic lines the despair of agnosticism:

> "By the sea, by the desolate nocturnal sea,
> Stands a youthful man,
> His breast full of sadness, his head full of doubt.
> And with bitter lips he questions the waves:
>
> "'Oh solve me the riddle of life!
> The cruel, world-old riddle

Concerning which, many a head has been racked—
Heads in hieroglyphic caps,
Heads in turbans and in cowls,
Periwigged heads, and a thousand other
Poor, sweating human heads.
Tell me, what signifies man?
Whence does he come? Whither does he go?
Who dwells yonder above the golden stars?'

"The waves murmur their eternal murmur,
The winds blow, the clouds flow past.
Cold and indifferent twinkle the stars,
And—a fool awaits an answer.*

This little poem is a wonderfully artistic and beautiful sketch of the human heart that has failed to find its bearings in life; it is full of bitterness and disappointment, branding the noblest aspiration of the thinker, the search for light on the main problem of existence as a vain undertaking which a clever man will wisely abandon.

And at first sight, the poet's despair seems justified. Here we are—frail creatures of conditions which we do not control, hungry for food, beset with innumerable dangers that almost at every minute of our existence threaten to destroy us, burning with various desires, full

* Translated by Emma Lazarus.

of hopes and fears, yearning for innumerable things which we expect will give us pleasure and assure our happiness, drifting along on the infinite ocean of time, without seeing a goal in which we can find the satisfaction of our many wants: and the anxious question rises in us, Whence do we come, and Whither do we fare? This question, we need not hesitate to say, is the main problem of life, and the answer which every one accepts to his own satisfaction, becomes necessarily the dominant factor and regulative principle of his whole life.

This problem possesses more than a mere theoretical value; it is a matter of practical and most vital importance; for the solution of this problem serves us as a mariner's compass; it helps to guide us and will generally determine the direction of the course of our life's ship.

There are many other problems which temporarily appear more urgent and may prove more attractive, yet none of them retains that lasting importance which the question of our Whence and Whither possesses. The elabo-

ration of a mathematical theorem is of great interest to the mathematician; the deciphering of ancient hieroglyphs will absorb the concentrated attention of archæologists and give us the key to problems of the past; the solution of puzzles and conundrums will prove an enjoyable diversion to the wit who in congenial company whiles away an idle hour; but among all the problems that can ever be proposed, those which are really serious are more or less dependent upon our problem, which is the fundmental problem of life.

The answer which is given to the problem of man's Whence and Whither constitutes the essence of religion. Your solution of this problem is your religion.

Religion is conviction. It is the conviction of a man with regard to the significance of life. And this conviction conditions our general attitude in the world; it gives color to our existence; it moulds our sentiments; it determines our sympathies and antipathies; it is the mainspring of our actions; in a word, it is the quintessence of our soul.

In the history of mankind the problem of

the whence and whither of man was first approached by prophets and priests, by those who saw its practical bearings on moral conduct; and the solution of the prophet, as a rule, bears the stamp of instinctive discoveries. The practical purpose of the problem stands in the front, and a theoretical explanation forms the background, pretending to be the essential thing, the key that will unlock all mysteries, and comes as a revelation of that power to which we must conform and whose authority we must accept as a final decision.

All problems of practical importance are first practically solved. Mankind has been groping its way and is groping still. We can say the same of almost all the great leaders of our race, that they builded better than they knew. Progress, no doubt, is as much a matter of necessity, of natural law, as is the growth of a tree; but, on the part of man, most of the advance is made by lucky incidents, happy guesses of genius, by the visions of dreamers, by inspiration; and all blessings appear, and actually are in this sense, by the grace of God. The lever was discovered millenniums before

the science of mechanics could explain the theory of the lever, and even to-day there are many discoveries made, the theory of which remains shrouded in mystery. The religious question has been solved for practical purposes by the founders of the various religions in a practical way, as a system of morals; and the underlying theory found expression in myths, in parables, in dogmatic formulations of symbolical formulas, in creeds and confessions of faith. The theoretical difficulties are, as a rule, passed over with the declaration that the solution of the problem must be accepted as divine revelation without argument, simply on the ground of its inner evidence.

We propose here to survey the facts of the problem and show them in their connexion with the universe and with the ultimate ground of all existence, as well as in their correlation among themselves. Our intention is to systematise the facts without resorting to hypothetical assumptions and also without at all entering into the theories that have been proposed as a solution, be they religious or metaphysical; and, I hope, we shall learn, first,

that the problem is not entirely beyond the ken of human comprehension; secondly, that the facts themselves present a solution the moral lesson of which cannot be mistaken; and, thirdly, that we shall appreciate the religious solutions which anticipate by instinctive inspiration some of the most important results of the science of these latter days,—nay, of the distant future; for we expect that with the progress of knowledge many details will be brought to light which will corroborate the injunctions of the religion of love and good-will on earth and will justify its ethics of sacrifice as set forth in the example of Him who died on the cross as a martyr of His Messianic mission.

SUBJECTIVITY AND OBJECTIVITY.

An analysis of our own being reveals to us first of all the spirituality of our own existence. We are conscious; that is to say, man consists of feelings varying in kind, and in clearness, and in intensity. There are pleasures and pains and indifferent states. There are images of sight, sounds, tastes, smells,

and feelings of touch and temperature. The motions executed by the efforts of our muscles are noted. Further there are commotions urging us to action, there are representations of things, of our own self, of our bodily conditions, of our exertions and deeds, of our hopes and fears, of our desires, our volitions, our plans of action, and other thoughts—an infinite variety of feelings.

Feelings are most wonderful phenomena. If feelings did not exist, the universe would be a grand display of physical forces without any purpose, a kaleidoscopic exhibition without any meaning; life would be mere mechanical motion, and the events of the world's evolution would possess no significance.

What are feelings?

The philosophers of the old-fashioned materialism attempted to explain feeling from matter and motion, but they failed lamentably. Cabanis and Karl Vogt spoke of thought as "a secretion of the brain" and compared it to the secretions of the liver and the kidney. If thought were a secretion of the brain, the chemist ought to be able to analyse

thought, and we might have it bottled up and sold at the grocer's in tin cans. The truth is that sentiments, sensations, perceptions, and thoughts, or briefly, all kinds of feelings are not material at all. Materiality and feeling are two disparate ideas; and why? Because feelings do not belong to the domain of objective existence, but are subjective states.*

The contrast between feelings and things cannot be emphasised strongly enough. They are radically different in their nature.

Selfhood in itself is feeling; otherness, whatever it may be in itself, is always, so far as it is concrete, represented by our senses as matter in motion; and its interactions are determined by the laws of form, causation, time, and space.

The contrast between feeling and objectivity has been brought out most clearly by Leibnitz who emphasises the truth that feelings of others, as feelings, cannot be felt or seen or perceived. He says:

"If we could imagine a machine the operation of

*For further details see the chapter "The Error of Materialism" in the author's *Fundamental Problems*, 2d ed., pp. 350–354

which would manufacture thoughts, feelings, and perceptions, and could think of it as enlarged in all its proportions, so that we could go into it as into a mill, even then we would find in it nothing but particles jostling each other, and never anything by which perception could be explained."

Feelings as such cannot be explained from principles of mechanics, and the reason is obvious: feelings are subjective, not objective. Every subject feels its own feelings; it cannot directly apprehend the feelings of others. For all otherness, all things not-ourselves, make their presence felt by resistance, and resistance is objectivity, i. e., something confronting or opposing us, which is apperceived in the shape of bodily existence.

Suppose that there were ghosts of things that were real, or any entities that could affect us somehow so as to force us to perceive their presence; we should through contact with them feel a sensation, and the cause of the sensation would necessarily appear as an objective phenomenon. In other words, the cause of this sensation, as of all other sensa-

tions, would represent itself as consisting of matter.

Materiality is objectivity, and objectivity is the presence of otherness.

While feeling and objectivity are disparate, they need not be separate. Objectivity and subjectivity are two different sets of abstraction, and neither of them may exist as an isolated entity. In the case of our own body, both are intimately interrelated as the inside and the outside of the same reality. We ourselves are feelings, and wherever through our senses we become acquainted with our limbs, we find ourselves possessed of the same corporeality as other objects. Our body appears to us as well as to others as an object among other objects of the objective world. Thus we argue from our own experience when we assume that bodies analogous to our bodies are possessed of analogous feelings, and the conclusion appears justified that creatures of another organisation are in their inner subjectivity souls of another type.

The limit of sentiency seems to be reached when we leave the domain of animal organ-

isms and descend into the kingdom of plants; but even here we find irritability, and the claims of botanists that plants are possessed of peculiar kinds of souls, of plant-souls, can by no means be refuted.

We may regard the kingdom of organised life as the realm of those phenomena which show evidences of soul-life, of sensibility and irritability; but the inorganic kingdom is for that reason not absolutely void of an analogous, although we may grant, a lower kind of subjectivity. Chemicals apparently exercise choice, for we find, they eagerly seek one another or abandon one liaison for the sake of a preferred partner; and we have no other means of clearly describing their behavior than by allegories selected from analogous occurrences in the human world, that is, by characterising them as "affinities."

The whole world is aglow with a spontaneous activity which betrays animation and life. Every speck of reality has an intrinsic proclivity to do something; and the action of things, so far as we can judge, depends upon their form.

Life (in the sense of activity, or better, activeness) is a universal feature of existence, and what we call life in the limited sense of the word is that one kind of life which through organisation rises above the dumb animation of purely physical existence into the realm of consciousness and thought.

We distinguish three degrees of life: First, the general life of nature, which is identical with existence in general. Secondly, organised life, which characterises the phenomena of the animal and vegetal kingdoms; and thirdly, psychical life, which appears to be limited to the animal kingdom alone. There is a radical difference between the three kinds of life, which are like three concentric circles. The smallest circle of most limited circumscription is a part of the middle circle of a wider circumscription, and the latter in its turn is contained in the largest all-comprehensive circle. All psychical life is organised and all organised life is in its elements a display of the universal life.

We need not assume that the combustion of a flame is a sentient process; nor need we

believe that plants are conscious: but we are driven to the conclusion that the potentiality of feeling lies latent in inorganic nature, and its rise is simply due to a peculiar interaction of its molecules such as actually takes place in the living substance of all animal creatures, from the amœboids upwards to the highest organisms of the zoölogical kingdom.

Accordingly, subjectivity or the inner state of reality, is existence as it is in itself; objectivity, or the external appearance of reality, is existence as it presents itself to other existence. From the simple subjectivity of inorganic nature the higher subjectivity of organised life originates which manifests itself in feelings.

Feelings are states of awareness. They rise from the indistinct irritation of experiencing resistance of some kind. When new impressions are made, they are felt to be this and not that. In the further course of development they run up through a scale of distinctions from the crude apprehension of contact to a vivid discrimination of self in contrast to not-self. Thus feelings are the product of a

two-fold interaction, first an interaction between subject and object, or the apprehension of impacts felt to be external; and secondly the interaction of correlated internal conditions, i. e., comparisons of two, or several feelings, constituting an organisation of the subject. Organised life, therefore, is the condition of sentiency.

THE ORIGIN OF ORGANISED LIFE.

Our scientists cannot produce the forms of any kind of organised life in their test-tubes, but they have discovered that the materials of which plants and animals consist are the very same elements as those of the inorganic world. The hope of discovering a life-substance has not been realised, and we are therefore inevitably driven to the conclusion, which is now commonly accepted as a tautology, that the nature of organised life is due to its organisation, viz., it is a matter of form.

Life is a process, not a substance; it is a slow oxidation in which the form of the living substance remains the same. Thus its characteristic feature is a metabolism, or a con-

stant change of material with a preservation of form. The waste products are discarded, which is called dissimilation; and the new materials that come to replace them are assimilated, which means, they replace atom for atom and molecule for molecule, thus continuing the life process in exactly the same way. If assimilation surpasses dissimilation there is growth, viz., an increase assimilated forms, which, being the same in kind, are a reproduction of the form of life from which they take rise.

We need not wonder that organised life has not as yet been produced artificially; for even the lowest organisms with which we are acquainted have a long history and in order to produce the tiniest bacillus, a chemist would have to let the ingredients pass through all the influences that have shaped its particular form of life, among which there may be conditions which he cannot repeat in his laboratory.

We cannot here recapitulate the history of the problem of the origin of life, nor give an account of how far science has succeeded in

the artificial reproduction of the products of organised life. With reference to the main point, here under consideration, be it sufficient to quote Professor Clifford, who sums up the question as follows:*

"We know from physical reasons that the earth was once in a liquid state from excessive heat. Then there could have been no living matter upon it. Now there is. Consequently non-living matter has been turned into living matter somehow."

The rise of organised life apparently leads to, and renders possible, the rise of sentiency from the insentient and purely physical life of the great storehouse of nature; but more important than the problem of sentiency is, for our present purpose, the problem of the rise of mentality.

THE ORIGIN OF MIND.

What is the mind, and how does the mind originate?

The mind of man is a marvellous phenomenon, because it possesses the quality of directing, of marshalling, of ruling the things

* Clifford, *Virchow on the Teaching of Science.*

of his surroundings. Man is the king of creation, the sovereign of the earth, and he has become the master of destiny through his mind.

Man thinks; he devises, he plans, he acts with design; and thus he, a relatively weak creature, conquers the world, exterminates wild brutes, subdues and tames those that can become serviceable to him; tills the ground; invents machinery to which he harnesses the forces of nature, steam and electricity; and the path of further progress stretches out before him in vistas that know no boundaries.

The grandeur of the effect of man's mentality has blinded psychologists to the simplicity of the phenomenon. Most of the solutions are far-fetched and lose themselves in mysticism. The essential feature that characterises man's mentality is the faculty of representation. Man's thoughts are sentient images of the things and relations of the objective world; and thinking is simply a combining of these sentient images, and the attempt at adjusting them in such a way as to determine our action to suit our ends.

The problem of the origin of the mind, accordingly, will be solved in its main outlines if we can answer the question, how do the irritations or feelings of sentient beings become representative. Representativeness is the characteristic feature of mentality.

Suppose we have a sentient being that is exposed to the various impressions of the surrounding world. It will feel an irritation of a peculiar kind, perhaps under the influence of the rays of the sun, or on a change of temperature, or upon contact with a hard body, or when affected by various chemicals. Every impact of the outer world produces a reaction of some kind in the sentient substance, the form of which remains, as a whirl of water continues for a long time until it wears out by friction with the other particles which have remained quiet. The disturbance in sentient substance passes away, but it leaves a trace still preserving a disposition which, if stirred into renewed activity, will be a repetition of the original commotion.

The preservation of form is a universal quality of nature, for the product of every for-

mation remains until it is modified or perhaps entirely obliterated by the action of other forces; but in the domain of sentient life it acquires a special significance as the physical condition of memory. Memory is nothing but the psychical aspect of the preservation of physiological form. Some sense-impression or its reaction has left a trace which in the general metabolism preserves its form, for every particle discarded is replaced in the very same mode of grouping by another particle of the same kind, so that the structure remains the same in spite of the change of the material and possesses the capability of producing the same kind of feeling.*

Now let us consider the condition of a speck of living substance exposed to the influence of the surrounding world. It receives constantly a great variety of impressions which leave traces and render sundry parts specially adapted to receive special kinds of impressions. As the vibration of a definite note will set a tuning fork of the same pitch in motion and

*See Prof. Ewald Hering's excellent essay *On Memory*. English translation published by The Open Court Pub. Co., Chicago.

will pass by others, so the ether vibrations will affect the spots especially prepared for them by previous either-vibrations in the eye.

The development of definite paths of sense-impressions is not a matter of least resistance (as Mr. Spencer has it), but is due to the fact that sensory commotions naturally follow the grooves of their own pattern. It is a selection according to qualitative dispositions, and not a matter of forces to be overcome or of magnitudes that can quantitatively be measured.

Just as the eye originates under the influence of ether-waves, so other organs develop through the various reactions to the different impacts of the surrounding world.

It is obvious that the traces of the various impacts of the surrounding world will naturally be grouped in a definite order, thus creating a system of sense-organs which again will be associated through the commotions of their interactions, and all further growth will continue to be an orderly and systematic arrangement of the innumerable sense-impressions which pour in from the outside through the gate-ways of the senses. The systematisation

of the sense-impressions is as necessary and natural as is the systematic regularity of crystals, the formation of which depends simply upon their angle of crystallisation.

So far we have spoken of memory only and the building up of psychical structures through the constant repetition of sense-impressions, and we must now ask the question, raised above: How do psychical states acquire representativeness?

An impression upon any one of the organs of a sentient being in so far as it is felt, is called a sensation, and in so far as the sensation corresponds somehow in its form to the form of the cause that produced it, we call it an "image." The term image (which means likeness or copy) denoted originally only sensations of sight but is now applied by way of linguistic licence to any kind of sense-impression. We speak of sound-images, of images of touch, of taste, and of smell, and denote thereby the individual form of sensory commotions. Whenever a sense-impression is made, it travels on the path best fitted for its reception and awakens the image of the same

kind made by prior sense-impressions. The sight of a cat has left in the mind of a dog a definite memory-image; as soon as another cat presents itself to the dog, the new sense-impression sets up a commotion which travels to the old cat-image and reawakens its memory. The new sense-impression is felt to be the same in kind as the memory-image and the object whose presence has caused the sensation is no longer an absolutely unknown thing. We know little of the physiological functioning of the brain, but we are quite familiar with the psychical fact of the presence of sense-impressions and the reawakening of memory-images. For our present purpose the *how* of the physiology of the brain is indifferent and the fact *that* these processes take place is quite sufficient.

It is not necessary that sense-images should always be perfect pictures of the causes by which they are produced. The air-waves are not sounds, and ether-vibrations are not light, but certain sound-images in the ear correspond to certain air-waves in space, and certain images of sight correspond to certain ether-vibra-

tions issuing from objects of our surroundings, and it is sufficient that the same cause always produces the same effect. The uniform correlation that obtains between the same things and the same sensations makes recognition possible. The same kind of sensation comes to be regarded as indicating the presence of the same kind of cause, and thus the sense-images acquire a representative value, they signify objects; they become symbols of things.

Significance is the characteristic feature of spirituality.

The most primitive sorts of significance are sensations which are interpreted to be pictures of the concrete objects of experience.

And there is this strange feature to be noticed. We do not feel the sense-impressions of our senses, the compression of the organs of touch, the images of sight, the commotions of the auditory nerves, etc., but our sense-impressions feel the objects by whose presence they are caused. We feel the resistance of the table, we see the tree outside, we hear the words spoken without our ear.

Thus the soul is truly telepathic; it is an instrument for taking note of and recording objects and events that take place at a distance.

The soul in itself is subjectivity; but it is like a mirror: it reflects the objective world. The objective value of its images is the main thing; and upon their truthfulness the worth of the soul depends.

The animal mind is limited to sensation, to a thinking in sense-images, and could only pass beyond it to a higher condition, if it could form symbols that would be representative of these representations, and thus classify them in abstract conceptions. This is done through language. Word-symbols denote whole classes of sensations and thus tie large bundles of them together into units that can be as easily handled as single sense-impressions.

Words are symbols of symbols; they are sounds signifying entire sets of significant experiences, and thus by an economy of thought (as Mach would say) language becomes the instrument through which the lower mentality of the brute develops into the human mind.

We are now ready to give a brief definition of the nature of the soul as being "a system of sentient symbols."

Our answer to the question, What is the nature of the soul? is perhaps much simpler than could be anticipated and may at first sight appear disappointing to those who had expected a definition that would be high-sounding and mystifying. Most people love mystification, and have a contempt for that which is simple and intelligible. But it seems to me that thoughts which are simple and intelligible are not the worse for it, and will prove more useful and even more dignified than bewildering and hazy ideas.

What after all is more simple than that which furnishes the most general explanation, and we shall not have a proper conception of that which is best and highest until we comprehend it in its simplicity.

THE RISE OF SUBJECTIVITY.

A consideration of the contrast that obtains between physical and psychical phenomena, suggests the idea that the significance of

evolution consists in the gradual rise and the increasing importance of the subjective side of nature. In the realm of physics the subjective, apparently, plays no part whatever, and might, for all we know, be absent. The atoms of chemical substances are guided neither by pleasure and pain, nor by ideas, i. e., representative feelings. Hence their behavior does not change; they do not learn by experience. They combine or separate, they dissolve, they congeal, they burn, in the selfsame way again and again. However, in the domain of organised life, feelings play an important part. Organisms are modified by experience; they are endowed with memory; they develop ideas, or representative feelings, and their subjectivity grows in importance until in man it becomes the dominant factor determining his course of action. By an organisation of the subjectivity of nature the soul rises into existence and creates the hyperphysical domain of spiritual life.

The contrast of subjectivity and objectivity and the interaction between the two is the condition under which the soul rises. If there

were not the disposition of innerness in nature, if one part of reality could not become aware of the existence of other parts, sentient beings could not come into being. We must regard this feature of subjectivity as an intrinsic and inalienable property of nature, and we would thus not countenance the idea that the appearance of soul-life is a mere accident which took place by hap-hazard. On the contrary, we would deem it probable that organised life appears wherever the conditions are present with the same necessity as vapors and fluids crystallise at a specific temperature.

Subjectivity is the condition of the soul, but subjectivity does not constitute its character. The character* of a man's thoughts and sentiments has been stamped upon his sentiency by sense-impressions that come from the outside, all of which, though extremely variagated and individual, bear the traces of a uniformity that pervades the objective world. The uniformities of nature, as the very word indi-

*Character (from χαράσσειν, to scratch) means that which has been scratched into a thing; the letter, or picture, or symbol chiselled into a stone.

cates, are regularities of form; and it is the perception of the regularities of form which in the course of evolution comes to constitute man's rationality.

Our next problem therefore will be an inquiry into the nature of form and the formative factors of the objective world, as being the mould in which man's soul has been cast.

THE MOULD.

FORM AND THE LAWS OF FORM.

BY form we understand any shape or structure, any combination of forces, any constellation of points or atoms, any relational arrangement or configuration; and it is obvious that form is the all-important feature of reality.

Science is a tracing of form; it is a description of facts in their causal concatenation.

Science traces transformations to the movements that start the change (to their *causes*); it analyses the nature of the changing things (discovering the *reasons* of the change), and accounts for the surrounding influences (called *conditions*).*

Natural laws are formulas which in the

*For a detailed exposition of the problem of causation compare the author's *Fundamental Problems*, pp. 79-109, and the *Primer of Philosophy*, pp. 137-172.

tersest possible way describe the actions of things. They are comprehensive answers given to the question why things act in special ways, ultimately reducing reasons to universal statements, which are applications of the laws of form.

As the best known instance we cite the law of gravitation. Bodies fall to the ground because they are attracted by the earth. Comets are attracted by the sun and move round it in the form of a conic section which is the diagonal of their own movement and the solar attraction. All bodies attract each other, and the force of their attraction varies directly as the product of the masses of the bodies and inversely as the square of the distance. Attraction is a fact of the objective world, and its force can be measured and formulated. Thus science, in determining the nature of gravitation, arrives ultimately at a description in terms of mathematics, the science of pure space-forms.

In the same way, all the sciences approach the solutions of their various problems by reducing their statements of fact to comprehen-

sive formulas, which are always applications of some one of the sciences of form, i. e., arithmetic, algebra, logic, geometry, or the theory of change.*

The work of exact science always begins with measuring and counting, which are a determination of quantitative form; and in addition there is a consideration of grouping or configuration, which is qualitative form. The amount and proportion of ingredients in chemicals is not sufficient; we must also know the way in which they combine; but in either case, science is nothing but a tracing of form.

The chemist speaks of different substances as elements, simply because, with the means now at his disposal, he is unable to break up their forms and determine their nature according to the laws of molecular statics and dynamics. No one, however, since the dis-

* Kant speaks of *reine Naturwissenschaft* as that kind of purely formal science which treats of the purely formal laws that underlie the natural sciences. These laws are the law of causation and its counterpart the law of the conservation of matter and energy, which may be supplemented by a consideration of the origin of new forms and the changes of form through combination and separation of old forms. It is practically the pure science of transformation. and we propose to translate it here by "theory of change."

covery of the law which bears Mendeljeff's name can doubt that the differences of the elements are due to a difference of form.

We speak of laws of form, but these laws are not decrees, not ukases or acts of legislation. Like all laws of nature, they are descriptive formulas, which from given facts predict the result. If you add "one" to "one," you have "two," and you will always have "two." If two angles in a plane triangle are together ninety degrees, the third angle will be a right angle. We say that the laws of pure form are necessary, but their necessity is not compulsion, it is not an application of violence with brute force, but simply a prediction of the results that will be produced without fail. The term "necessity" has proved misleading and has erroneously given rise to much anxiety as to the tyranny of law and the yoke of iron that all creatures bear. There is no such a thing: The laws of nature, and the more general laws of pure form, are simply descriptions of the consequences of given conditions. There is no curtailment of liberty or freedom of will, but sim-

ply a state of the determinedness of the present by the past, and of the future by the present.

Now forms have this peculiarity that the abstract laws which determine them (the mathematical uniformities) are necessary and universal; they constitute an empire of absolute verities which are immutable, uncreate, and indestructible. But the concrete forms themselves, the actualisation of the immutable laws of form, are always transient and subject to change. They have originated through a process of formation, are modified according to the forces that act upon them, and disappear through disintegration while producing new compounds. Pure forms know of no origin and no decay. They are eternal.

Every concrete thing that exists is in a special place, it is here, not there; it is this particular thing, not that; but the laws of form are not thus limited: they are here *and* there. They are here, yet not here alone, but everywhere.

Form, accordingly, is that which constitutes the suchness of things; materiality the

thisness. Materiality is indispensable for making things actual; it renders them concrete and imparts to them particularity; but form is the essential feature of all existences as it gives them their own distinctive character.

The domain of pure forms and purely formal laws is a spiritual empire; which is to say, it is not material but supermaterial, not physical but hyperphysical.

THE DIVINITY OF PURE FORM.

The truth of the eternity and omnipresence of pure forms as the indestructible prototypes of all bodily forms was formulated with great clearness by Plato in his doctrine of ideas. Plato's "ideas" which exist above time and space are nothing else than pure forms; they alone, as the abiding in this world of change, are regarded as real; all material things are fleeting phenomena; being transient and shadowy appearances of the immutable types of existence. Pain and misery attach to the material, not to its proto-

type, not to the pure form that finds in some bodily concreteness its temporary abode.

The realm of pure forms has not only been the foundation of science and philosophy, but has also become the source of religious comfort and artistic aspiration. The logos-idea which brings Christianity into direct relation with Platonism, is nothing but the quintessence of the doctrine of ideas; for the Logos is the most comprehensive term of the ultimate unison and significance of all ideas. The "word," as the embodiment of rational thought, symbolises the general principle of the logicality of all the relations that determine the formation of the world.

The term *logos* is used only once in the New Testament, viz., in the very beginning of the introductory sentences of the fourth Gospel, and since it is not repeated in the Gospel itself, in spite of the paramount importance attached to it in the introduction, these first lines are under the suspicion of having been added by some one who was not the author of the book itself. However that may be, the term has been accepted by Chris-

tianity and has become the corner-stone of its philosophical foundation. At present, the idea of "the Logos that was in the beginning" and has become flesh in Jesus of Nazareth, has become endeared to the Christian world more than any other expression of Christian sentiment and thought.

The term *logos** has a long history in

* *Logos* (λόγος) means "word" in the sense of rational expression of thought. As a philosophical term it was first employed by Heraclitus who uses it to denote the logicality of existence, the law that pervades nature and constitutes the order of the cosmos, as well as the principle that underlies the adjustments of human society. Thus the Logos forms on the one hand a contrast to matter and motion; and is distinguished from the world-fire (πῦρ) from which all things have developed. On the other hand it is identified with the necessity of natural law (ἀνάγκη or εἱμαρμένη) and with the moral ideal of justice (δίκη). Nothing can be thought to be void of the Logos, and the human soul is claimed to be a a special manifestation of it.

Plato uses *Logos*, *Nous*, and *Sophia* as synonyms and gives prominence to the cognate term εἶδος, i. e., image, type, or idea. The Stoics, however, lay again much stress upon the Logos conception and use the word in the plural form λόγοι as a synonym of Platonic ideas.

The Christian conception of the Logos has been derived from the Neo-Platonist Philo, an Alexandrian Jew of Greek culture, who called it "the son of God," "the first born son," "the second God," "the likeness of God," "the arch priest." Philo's Logos is the representative of the highest God and the medium of his revelation to the world.

It is interesting to find a similar use of terms denoting "word" in India, in Iran and also in China. In the Vedas we read of "the voice in the cloud" (Vâch âmbhrinî) that issues from the forehead

which several rival terms play an important part, such as *sophia* or wisdom, *dynamis* or power (δύναμις), the *icon* (εἰκών) or image, also called the second deity, *æon*,* or the spirit of the divine dispensation in time, the *en-soph* (אֵן סוֹף) or "infinitude" of the Kabbalah which in one aspect is *ayin* (אַיִן) or the non-existent, and in another becomes manifest as the ten *shepiroth* (שְׂפִירוֹת) or intelligences, in the archetypal man. The Kabbalah claims a pre-existence of all souls in the Divine emanations—in the realm of pure forms which are the eternal thoughts of God, the creative factors that shape the world in its evolution.

Non-Christian religions have similar conceptions which are clearest in Buddhism. Buddha is he who acquires enlightenment,

of the Father and hurls the deadly arrow against the foe of Brahman;" and Ahura Mazda, the Lord Omniscient, when attacked by Angra Mainyu hurls him down by uttering the Honover or Ahuna Vairya, the veritable word, the same which he reveals to Zoroaster as the prayer of the righteous (Cf. Farg. XIX, 9, 43. Yasha, XIX). Historically independent is Lao-Tze's conception of the *Tao*, which means Word, Path, or Reason. The *Ch'ang Tao* or Eternal Reason (the Logos) is actualised in the *sheng yen*, the saintly man.

* *Æon* (αἰών) means time, then the dispensation of an epoch in the evolution of the world, and in Neo-Platonic philosophy the spirit of such a dispensation.

the eternal bodhi. He is pre-existent in the Tusita heaven, the domain of unmaterial and uncreated spirituality. He enters the virgin womb of Maya, his mother, in the shape of a white elephant, the symbol of wisdom, and is born as Bodhisatva, the Buddha to be. He passes through all the stages of a search for enlightenment for the sake of delivering mankind from error and sin, until he finds the bodhi under the sacred bodhi-tree, while the starry constellation that indicates the fulfilment of the times rises on the horizon at the dawn of day. Nirvana is the attainment of the realm of the indestructible, the arupa or bodiless, i. e., the pure form which is without material form; and Nirvana is attainable in this life by ceasing to cling to anything particular, one's own body included. Thus it is the annihilation of all sinful desire, of egotism, greed, and self-indulgence. It is the attainment of the bodhi which now takes its abode in the Buddha's personality, using it as its instrument for the purpose of extending the bliss of salvation to all the world.

The Buddhists insist on the truth that all

compounds will be dissolved, and derive from it the moral, not to cling to transient things, but to find the resting-place of that which is not subject to decay, the unmaterial, the uncreate, that which never originated and never will pass away. The world of compounds is the universe of bodily form; the realm of the uncreate is the empire of pure form.

The Zarathustrian doctrine of "fravashis which have existed from of old," or eternal prototypes of the various beings which remain with their bodily actualisations as a kind of guardian spirits, is quite analogous to the conception of Platonic ideas and of pure forms. The fravashi of the prophet revealed itself in a vision to the primeval bull three thousand years before it was incarnated in "the glorious man-child."*

The empire of pure form is in one sense indeed a pure Nothing or Non-existence, as the Jewish thinkers said that wrote the Kabbalah. Pure form is unmaterial, it is not anything particular and concrete, but it is the

* Dk. 7, 2, 59–61. West's translation, *Sacred Books of the East*, XLVII. 31.

law that determines, according to particular conditions, the shape, the character, the nature, the actions and the fate of every particular thing or being. As such, however, it is not a non-entity, but the most real reality of the actual world. It is above time and space; in a word, it is superreal, for it does not depend upon the existence of bodily reality. And all the pure forms together are one inseparable system, a harmonious body of interrelated laws, or truths, or eternalities, or whatsoever we may call them, which in their oneness constitute the immutable, omnipresent and eternal Deity that sustains the world and directs its course. This oneness of all the norms of existence is the power* that makes for righteousness; it is the curse of sin, the bliss of goodness, the standard of right, the condemnation of falsehood, and the prototype of truth.

*"Power" is used here as an allegorical expression. It does not mean power in the common acceptation of the word, which is the power of muscle or steam that can be measured in foot-pounds. In quoting this well-known definition of God, we interpret "power" as that super-dynamic efficacy which determines the direction of power, and thus without being either matter or energy is that which disposes over all motions and actions.

This is not pantheism, but Nomotheism, a view of God which conceives him as the eternal norm, as the *nomos* (νόμος) of existence. It is the proclamation of the superpersonal God, being a purification of the traditional conception which looks upon God as a huge individual. It teaches that God, the highest norm of existence, is possessed of a definite character, giving purpose to the world and being the standard of truth and right, the ultimate *raison d'être* of all that is, and was, and will be.

SCHILLER THE PROPHET OF PURE FORM.

What a fruitful idea the conception of the empire of pure form has been in art and poetry! Friedrich Schiller sings a hymn of religious praise to pure form in his poem *Ideals and Life*, and describes the home of art and poetic inspiration as follows:

"In yon region of pure forms,
Sunny land e'er free from storms,
Misery and sorrow cease to rave.
There our sufferings no more pierce the soul,
Tears of anguish there no longer roll.
Nought remains but mind's resistance brave.

Beauteous as the rainbow's colored hue,
Painted on the canvas of the cloud,
E'en on melancholy's mournful shroud
Rest reigns in empyrean blue."

The material world is a world of death, and all bodily existence is doomed to become the prey of Hades:

"Yonder power whose tyranny we bemoan,
On our bodies has a claim alone.
Form is never bound by time's design.
She, the gods' companion,* blessed and bright,
Liveth in eternal realms of light
'Mongst the deities, herself divine.
Wouldst thou on her pinions soar on high
Throw away the earthly and its woe!
To the ideal realm for refuge fly
From this narrow life below."

Schiller loves to utilise Greek mythology, because the personification of natural laws, of ideals, and other influential factors of life, in the noble types of the Olympian gods, appeals to his artistic taste; but his description of the empyrean region reminds us, at the same time, of St. John's Revelation, where we read: "And God shall wipe away all tears

* *Die Gespielin seliger Naturen*, means the companion of the blessed ones, i. e., the gods, and not (as Mr. Bowring has it), "blissful Nature's playmate."

from their eyes, and there shall be no more death." Peace of soul exists alone in the realm of pure form; for what is painful struggle in real life, appears in the domain of the ideal merely as beauteous contrast. Pure form is divine, while its bodily realisation is mingled with that element that is of the earth earthy. Therefore the poet exhorts us, not to lust after the fruit of sensuality:

> "Wouldst thou here be like a deity,
> In the realm of death be free,
> Never seek to pluck its garden fruit.
> On its beauty thou may'st feed thine eyes
> Soon the impulse of desire will rise
> And enjoyment's transient bliss polute.
> E'en the Styx that nine times flows around
> Ceres' child's return could not delay;
> But she grasped the apple—and was bound
> Evermore by Orcus' sway."

Sensuality, says Schiller, involves us in the doom of death,—an idea in which Greek views are strangely mixed with Christian asceticism. So long as we are able to discard all earthly sorrow, and seek refuge in the realm of the ideal, we need not fear death. Death is the fate of Eve who tasted the forbidden fruit of sensual desire, but death has

no power over Proserpine, Ceres's daughter, the goddess of spring, whose return to life from the domain of Orcus, Styx cannot prevent.

And what is the ethics to which Schiller's philosophy of pure form leads? Schiller says:

"Man before the law feels base,
Humbled and in deep disgrace.
Guilt e'en to the holy ones draws nigh.
Virtue pales before the rays of truth.
From the ideal every deed, in sooth,
Must in shame and in confusion fly.
None created e'er surmounted this,
Neither a bridge's span can bear,
Nor a boat o'er that abyss,
And no anchor catches there.

"But by flying from the sense-confined
To the freedom of the mind,
Every dream of fear thou'lt find thence flown,
And the endless depth itself is filling.
If the Godhead animates thy willing,
It no longer sits upon its throne.*
Servile minds alone will feel its sway
When of law they scorn the rod,
For with man's resistance dies away
E'en the sovereignty of God."

*Schiller's expression that "God descends from his throne" and "abdicates his sovereignty," have been misunderstood by Mr. Bowring. He translates:

(The Godhead)
"Will soar upwards from its earthly throne."

This is an ethics both of modesty and of moral endeavor. Since the ideal can never be attained in its purity, even the holy man is not free from guilt, and absolute perfection can never be realised. Nevertheless, the ideal is not a beyond; it can become an immanent presence finding its incarnation in man. And the ideal ceases to appear as an implacable condemnation of our shortcomings as soon as it dominates our entire being. Says Schiller:

> "Nehmt die Gottheit auf in euren Willen,
> Und sie steigt von ihrem Weltenthron."
>
> [If the Godhead animates thy willing,
> It no longer sits upon its throne.]

That God reigns no longer above us, looks like outspoken atheism, but it is the atheism of Christ who said, "I and the Father are one." It is an expression of that moral endeavor which renders man divine, and gives rise to the ideal of the God-man.

The same spirit that permeates these stanzas, reappears in Schiller's poem *Words of Faith*, which contain a poetical formulation of Kant's three postulates, Freedom, Virtue, and God. Schiller says:

"These words I proclaim, important and rare
To all generations forever.
The heart to their truth will witness bear,
Through the senses you'll prove them never.*
Man will no longer his worth retain
Unless these words of faith remain.

"For LIBERTY man is created; he's free,
Though fetters around him be clinking.
Let the cry of the mob never terrify thee,
Nor the scorn of the dullard unthinking!
Beware of the slave when he breaks from his chain,†
But fear not the free who their freedom maintain.

"And VIRTUE is more than an empty sound,
In life you render it real.
Man often may stumble before it be found,
Still can he obtain this ideal.
And that which the learn'd in their learning ne'er knew,
Can be done by the mind that is childlike and true.

"And a GOD, too, there is, a purpose sublime,
Though frail may be human endeavor.
High over the regions of space and of time
One idea supreme rules forever.
While all things shifting are tempest pressed,
Yet the spirit pervading the change is at rest.

* Schiller has here in mind the contrast made by Kant between sensation rising from the outside and thought, having its roots in the pure forms of our mind. Schiller means to say that the three ideas, "freedom (i. e., moral responsibility), virtue, and God," are not sense-given.

† While Schiller says, "the slave must be feared when he frees himself, not the free man," Bowring translates, "Fear not the bold slave, nor the free man."

"Proclaim these three words, important and rare,
To all generations for ever,
The heart to their truth will witness bear,
Through the senses you'll prove them never,
Man will forever his worth retain,
While these three words of faith remain."

When Schiller speaks of God as "a purpose sublime"; literally, "a holy will," "*ein heiliger Wille*," and as "the idea supreme," "*der höchste Gedanke*," and when he contrasts God with the restlessness of the world, stating that "a spirit of rest pervades all change," "*Es beharret im Wechsel ein ruhiger Geist*," we do not believe that these expressions were framed under strain of versification. They must, in our opinion, be regarded as carefully worded definitions which are the matured product of the poet's thought, whose God is not an individual, not a supreme being, but a highest idea, an all-dominating norm. Here Schiller agrees with the philosophical conception of Christianity, which finds its expression in the Fourth Gospel where Christ says, "God is Love." Christ does not say, God is a loving being. Christ's

God is more than a being. His God is Love itself.

In the same way, Christ does not say, God is a spirit (as our translation has it), but πνεῦμα ὁ θεός, God is spirit.

MAN AS AN INCARNATION OF THE LOGOS.

The laws of form mould the world and determine the evolution of life, showing their potency in the formation of man.

What is man?

Is man a heap of atoms? Oh no! Living organisms are not statues, which preserve the same material until they break to pieces. The particles that constitute the human body come from the surrounding world: food from the soil, water from the well, oxygen from the air. They rush through the system and will soon pass out again. It has been calculated that even the most stable substances of a human organism are renewed on an average in about every seven years; and that organ which for good reasons is supposed to represent the seat of thought and sentiency, the nervous system, consists of the most unstable

tissues of all, being subject to a constant change whenever they are active. The particles that are in motion while I am now thinking, are being discarded at this very same moment as waste material.

Our tissues are constantly being disintegrated, and if death means disintegration, the old Latin church hymn is literally true, which reads:

"Media in vita nos in morte sumus."
[In the midst of life we are surrounded by death.]

As the light consumes itself while it burns, so our tissues suffer decay while we live; and we continue in life only because they are constantly redintegrated. The old forms break down, but new forms are being built up, and our identity depends solely upon this restoration of form.

Some people seek the essential quality of man's being in his vitality, and would identify him with the energy that is stirring in his nerves and muscles. We grant that the energy of man's bodily system is, as much as matter, an indispensable condition of man's existence, but it is not less accidental. The

energy that is needed for maintaining man's vitality has been derived from the external world, and is given back to it in the measure that it is used. The heat of the sun builds up the flora of the world and is stored up in the fruit of our fields. Thence it is imported in the shape of food into the bodily systems of animals and men, where it is transformed by assimilation into muscular and nervous substance. It is utilised for the various functions of life, and returns to the inorganic world as heat and work. Thus energy passes through the machinery of the human body as much as it does through a steam engine; and we must confess that the human element of man's life is not vitality itself, but the mode of his vitality.

Man is neither matter nor energy, but a peculiar form of matter and energy. His soul has been impressed upon him by the moulding influences of the uniformities of nature, the laws of form.

This truth is so obvious that we meet with a statement of it in one of the oldest records of our race. We read in Genesis ii. 7:

"The Lord God *formed* man of the dust of the earth."

Man is not the dust of which his body consists, nor the life that pulses in his heart, but the image which has been stamped upon the animated dust.

Man is a sentient being, but it is his spirituality, not his sentiency, that is the characteristic feature of his being. Sentiency man shares with all animals; but man's sentiency is more refined, his pain more keenly felt, while the possibility of foreseeing the future adds a greater intensity to the burdens of life. Spirituality, however, is the characteristic feature of man's manhood which gives him dominion over the forces of nature and renders ideal aspiration and moral endeavor possible. The highest and most important forms that constitute man's spirituality have been begotten by rational speech, which in the Fourth Gospel is called the Logos,—a term which for good reasons has acquired a religious meaning, as denoting the mould in which man's soul has been cast.

Every man is an incarnation of the eter-

nal principles of reason, but the perfect man, the highest moral ideal of mankind, is their full and final realisation, which therefore in a special sense is called the actualised Logos.

Man's spirituality consists in a comprehension of the uniformities of nature, and he may therefore be regarded as an embodiment of the quintessence of the cosmic order, as a reflexion of the divinity that pervades the world.

Thus we accept on philosophical grounds the religious truth that man has been created in the image of God, and the ideal man is an incarnation of the Logos.

WHENCE?

THE EGO.

SO far our investigation has been of a general nature, treating of consciousness, of life, of form, and of the forms of man's sentiency in their significance. We are now prepared to enter into details and begin an analysis of the particulars of our own self.

It is our particular self, our personality, that we care for most. Says Goethe:

> "Prince, and folks, and those who conquer,
> Mankind in totality,
> Freely own that all they hanker
> For is 'personality.'"

Every one of us is quite definite and different from others, and the peculiarities which are particularly our own, are naturally very important to us, and we are interested to know how we have become such as we are.

What am I? How did I originate, and whence did I come? What are the causes that brought me into being and determined the formation of my personality? Do I remain the same, and if not, what constitutes my identity throughout so many changes?

* * *

What do I mean when I say, "I"? Apparently the whole personality of myself,—my consciousness, my volitions, my thoughts, my hopes, and also my bodily system with all its limbs,—in brief, my individuality which every one is inclined to believe is quite distinct, absolutely separate, and original. In philosophical language this feeling of one's own personality is commonly called the *ego* and sometimes, although improperly, the *Me*.*

When a man says "I," he utters a word—a simple little word, but of exceeding impor-

* The grammatical objections to the term *Me* are, as all questions of purely grammatical correctness, irrelevant. The grammar of a language changes, and the accusative has acquired the value of a *casus absolutivus*: but the form *Me* has been monopolised by the translators of Fichte, and is therefore liable to be confused with Fichte's ego-conception, which is not psychological but metaphysical.

tance. It is not the first word the child learns to use, but the first use of the word "I" may be regarded as the dawn of the child's developing personality.

In the adult man, the ego is a consciousness of great complexity in which we distinguish three layers or strata, growing one from another and forming one organic whole These three layers are: (1) the consciousness of our corporeality in its unity; (2) the consciousness of the continuity of our personal history, and (3) the consciousness of an identification of our own being with our aspirations and ideals.

THE UNITY OF MAN'S CORPOREALITY.

The cerebral structure which commands the pronunciation of the word "I" by the muscles of the mouth undoubtedly lies in the motor centre of speech, viz., in the convolution of Broca which is situated at the upper border of the fissure of Sylvius on the left hemisphere of the brain. But more important than the site of the physiological structure of the word "I" is its significance, the

complexity of which forms a strange contrast to the simplicity of sound of this comprehensive term. The significance of the word "I," consisting of the sentiments that accompany the utterance of the sound "I," is what in psychology is called the ego.

The foundation of the notion "I" (i. e., the ego) consists of the conception of the speaker's own body in contrast to the surrounding world. It is of a local nature and appears as the consciousness of our skinbound existence, limited to definite dimensions in space. All the various limbs of the body are felt and represented as parts of one coherent system. This conception of one's own bodily existence in its totality indicates, as a rule, dimly, yet whenever thought of, strongly, the main divisions of our stature in their relations among themselves as well as to the outer world. Connected with it there is a general sentiment, vague and ill-defined, of a different tenor at different times, called *cœnæsthesis*, or, as the German physiologists translate it, *Gemeingefühl.*

The corporeal consciousness of the ego is

constantly present in a waking condition. It pops up first when the word "I" is uttered. Its main peculiarity is the predominance of sentiment. All the sensations at a given moment, including the more or less comfortable feelings of the intestines and other internal organs which cannot definitely be localised, are present, roughly registered according to the place where they seem to be seated.

Heredity.

Our corporeal existence with its organs and main dispositions has been inherited and thus the deepest and most basic layer of our personality which becomes illumined by self-consciousness is the product of factors which antedate our existence.

The problem of heredity does not fall within the scope of our present discussion, but we cannot help touching upon it when we ask, Whence comes this bodily system of which we are constituted? We are not concerned here with the problem, how heredity works, but simply with the fact, that it exists. No one denies that the physical constitution

of which our corporeal ego is the psychical exponent, is an ancient heirloom that has come down to us from our ancestors. Doctors disagree as to whether or not acquired characters can be transmitted by heredity, but all naturalists, and I may as well add, the unschooled also are one on the point that heredity is a law of nature and that heredity is traceable in the most trivial details. There are aberrations from the present type of a race, but these aberrations are explained either as symptoms of atavism or by a theory of arrested development. A white baby's hair may be blond or black, brown or red, but it will never have the curly wool of the negro. The reason is that the white race exhibits all these types and in all likelihood there are very few white individuals whose ancestors were throughout solely blond, or solely brown. Heredity does not mean a reproduction of the father's type, nor of the mother's type, nor a combination of the two, but a reproduction of the composite type of all ancestors, resulting in a new mixture, the idiosyncrasy of which escapes all our means of determination.

It would lead us too far to enter into the problem of heredity, its why and its how, questions which form an independent field of investigation of their own. Suffice it to say, that however wonderful the fact of heredity may be, we can easily understand, that if all the secret workings of nature lay open to our comprehension, we would probably deem heredity a matter of course. Heredity is simply preservation; its full meaning is that organisms preserve their form and continue to remain the same even in their reproductions.

Whatever the mode of transference may be by which the life impulses of the parent organism are transferred upon the sperm and the ovule, the fact of heredity itself remains unchallenged. Nobody doubts that the young life started thereby is a reproduction of its species, or, more accurately speaking, a continuance of the life of its ancestors. We prefer the expression continuance in order to point out the connexion between heredity and evolution.

Epigenesis.

We must in this connexion call attention to the inappropriateness of the term *evolution* which literally means unfoldment or a bringing out to visible appearance that which existed before in a latent form. Evolution is no evolving of latent form, but an increase and enrichment of living forms by additional growth, or briefly, as the theory has been called by a Greek term, *epigenesis*. The theory of epigenesis, as an explanation of the various forms of life, now in existence, was propounded, more than a century ago, in 1759, by Caspar Friederich Wolff in his *Theoria generationis*. His doctrine stood in opposition to the views of the greatest biological authorities of the time, which were the Frenchman Bonnet and a German Swiss Haller, who clung to the erroneous theory of an enfoldment of life by evolution. They believed that the ovule of a chicken egg contained an infinitely small chicken, and in a similar way all the life that develops upon earth existed in a latent form in the aboriginal germs from

which it has descended. This theory of encasement (*Einschachtelung* or *emboîtement*) has been surrendered; the word evolution, however, has been retained and stands now for its opposite, viz., epigenesis. The so-called doctrine of evolution of to-day is in all main points of contention the theory of the origin of the forms of life by additional growth. We need not go into details, for the main facts are sufficiently known. The reflexes that take place under the influences of the outer world harden into functions and develop organs. They are differentiated by a division of labor: the eye originates in response to the ether-waves of light, the ear in response to the air vibrations of sound, the organs of taste and smell by a chemical analysis of foreign substances. Muscles and nerves are formed, and all the advances made become hereditary, being reproduced again and again in new individuals that grow from sperms and ovules or in sexual generation from a combination of both.

The Consciousness of Corporeality.

The various limbs of our bodily system

become acquainted with one another by touch. There is a time when the eyes of the baby discover the presence of its own legs, and the astonishment is great when the hands touch the legs, while the legs experience the sensasation of being touched. I once carefully watched the expression of a baby's face at this important moment of its mental development, but I am sure that similar scenes must be familiar to all observing mothers and nurses. The baby enjoyed the new information and took delight in repeating the experiment of making feet and hands meet.

The hide-bound consciousness of our corporeality is composed of a great number of such experiments, in which two limbs of our body mutually play the parts of subject and object; and I might add here that whatever we know directly about our own bodily existence has been thus acquired through the channels of external sensation. Therefore our body is necessarily and naturally conceived and represented in our corporeal consciousness as an object in the objective world. There is no self-cognition by introspection pure and sim-

ple. All internal sentiments which on account of their being inaccessible to touch or to sight cannot become an object of observation to any one of our senses, are simply dull feelings; they remain unlocalised and unspecified and therefore hazy and undefined. As a rule, we are ignorant about the internal construction of our own self. The feeling of a comfortable condition passes unnoticed, while disturbances of any kind loom up in consciousness as pains without affording any conception of the real state of things. Internal pains and other feelings that lack the comparing control of the external senses, such as hunger and thirst, remain shapeless and nondescript; proving beyond the shadow of a doubt that all clear knowledge must be based upon objective observation, and that the much vaunted theory of introspection will never lead to definite results. This is the reason we are absolutely ignorant of the motions of our brain. While our brain is confessedly, for physiological reasons which we need not point out here, the seat of thinking and the central station of all our sensations, we are familiar only with the

significance of our brain-functions, not with their forms or modes of action.

The Image on the Retina.

The image of the tree that is pictured on the retina of the eye is not perceived as a chemical reaction of the color-substances in the rods and cones, nor as a commotion of the nerves in the optic tracts, nor as an affection of any cerebral matter in the centers of sight, but simply and solely as a tree outside. The significance alone of all the physiological processes of our nervous system, i. e., their final purpose, appears in consciousness; all the details of the process remain unheeded and are absolutely inaccessible to introspection.

Further, the images of objects are not apperceived in the inverted position as they appear on the retina, but as they are outside,—a fact which has unnecessarily mystified many physiologists and students of optics. The explanation of the phenomenon is this: the picture appears inverted on the retina, but its dimensions and successive parts are determined by the function of the muscles that

move the eyeball, laying down the directions in straight lines which from the affected patches of the retina-picture pass through the focus of the lense to the object outside. Thus, when looking up to the top of a tree, a direction upward is perceived which at once refers a point at the bottom of the retina to a point high up on the top of the tree. We feel, not the special spot on the lower part of the retina, but the whole function which results in our seeing the tree in the direction in which our eye-muscles hold the eye. In other words, we do not see the picture of the tree on our retina; but the sentient retina-picture with the coöperation of the sensory nerves that make a record of the motions of the muscles of the eyeball, see the tree outside and the picture appears therefore outside where our hands would find it, if we should walk up to the tree and touch it.

We have two eyes and yet we see one object only. There are two retina images of the same object, one on each retina, yet one object only appears in the field of vision. And why? because there is only one field of vision.

The two eyes look out upon the same object and their converging focuses indicate the spot where it is to be sought.

We can artificially become conscious of the fact that our vision is binocular, by pushing one eyeball out of place thus preventing the two retina images from coinciding, but in the normal state, the fact apprehended is not the function, but the purpose of the function: not the methods by which the aim of the activity of our senses is attained, but the aim itself. No doubt the images on the retina are sentient, but they are exactly the organs which do the seeing, not the things that are seen. Hence the unity of vision in spite of a two-hood of our organs of sight.

Futility of Introspection.

What is true of sight is true of all the other senses, and also of our abstract thought. The idea itself, i. e., the thought which we think, looms up in consciousness, not the function of thinking. We are absolutely incapable of self-introspection or a self-apprehension of the function of thought. As a re-

sult, we know neither the place where our thoughts take place nor the form in which they run their course; all that we know about the physiology of thought is by objective investigation and pathological observations.

The idea that the brain is the seat of thinking has so strongly impressed itself upon the present generation as to make us believe that we actually feel our thoughts to take place in our heads. But remember that Aristotle sought the seat of the rational soul in the breast, regarding the brain as a kind of refrigerator to cool off the blood.

Nothing can be more untrue than the old maxim, quoted by Marcus Aurelius, ἔνδον βλέπε, look within,—a maxim that is true enough in a certain sense, but has been insisted on in a wrong sense by intuitionalists, mystics, and all other lovers of the unintelligible. A famous modern poet voices this sentiment in these words:

> "Truth is within ourselves; it takes no rise
> From outward things."

Truth is a relation between subject and object. Truth is not, as Mr. Browning says:

"... produced mysteriously as cape
Of cloud grown out of the invisible air."

Truth is not comparable to clouds or hazy fogs, but to luminous images reflected in a clear mirror. Thus while it is true that truth is within, it yet rises from outward things by observation. No naturalist can discover a law of nature by introspection. By introspection we may consult our conscience, but even our conscience has been built up by experience, partly by race-experience. Conscience is our moral experience, which has grown automatic and instinctive; and a moralist who would investigate the truth of a moral rule or the reliability of the inner voice of conscience would have to follow the methods of the naturalist; he would have to fall back upon experience.

Truth cannot be based upon introspection but must ultimately always rest on observation.

Dispositions.

The corporeal system which constitutes our existence at the moment of our birth, consists of two things: (1) organic structures representing a very complex set of in-

herited reflex functions, and (2) large tracts of physiological conditions which are comparable to virgin tracts of land, the harvests from which depend upon the seeds that fall upon them. We call these tracts dispositions. For example, the knee-jerk is inherited; upon a proper irritation, the reflex motion will take place. In the same way the contraction and dilation of the iris in the eye in proportion to the light that is admitted is inherited. The reaction is automatic and presupposes a definite system of muscular and nervous functions the nature of which in all its main details is determined by heredity. In addition to these inherited reflex functions, there are dispositions, called talents or aptitudes. They are what Aristotle would call "potential" tendencies, the development and character of which depend upon stimulation by the experiences of life. The best instance is the power of speech which is an inherited tendency in man, but absent in animals. Language itself is not inherited, but the disposition to learn a language is undoubtedly a characteristic quality of human offspring.

Educate a baby-monkey in a perfectly human manner; teach him human ways, train his ears to human speech, and teach him one or several languages, he will probably never acquire even the rudiments of the faculty of speech; but the human infant possesses the aptitude of language as an inherited and inalienable disposition, and if physical shortcomings deprive it of all means of learning a language, it naturally develops a system of signs for the purpose of communicating its wants to its fellow-men. But it is the disposition only which is inherited, not the language itself. No Englishman knows English by heredity. The language that a child will speak does not depend upon its ancestry, but upon its surroundings and education. An English baby would learn Chinese, and a Chinese baby would learn English, if we could exchange them in their cradles.

The same is true of all dispositions, whatever be their nature. A talent for music may be an inherited disposition, but whether or not it will be developed, and if developed in a vigorous mind whether it will turn out to be

the powerful genius of a Beethoven, or a grand master like Bach, or a light-winged composer of waltzes like Strauss, or perhaps a frivolous cynic like Offenbach, will mainly depend upon the education received in life, and not so much upon the nature of the talent itself.

A Complex of His Ancestors.

Every individual takes up the torch of life and hands it over to the following generation, thereby preserving the special type of its own form of soul.

The heredity of our corporeal system and its dispositions connects the life of the individual with the history of its race, and considering its importance as the foundation upon which our entire personality has to be built, it teaches modesty to the man whose main ambition in life is originality. The hankering after originality is so natural that almost everybody has a period in his life in which he falls a prey to it. Originalomania is a kind of spiritual measels. In the language of Jean Paul Richter we might call it *die Flegeljahre*

of the soul, i. e., those years of indiscretion in which a man sows all his wild oats, and Goethe drastically characterises this disease at the moment when be begins to be cured of it, in these famous lines:

"From father my inheritance
Is stature and conduct steady;
From mother, my glee, that love of romance,
And a tongue that's ever ready.

"My grandpa was fond of ladies fair
Which still my soul is haunting
My grandma jewels loved to wear,
Like her I'm given to vaunting

"Now since this complex can't but be
The sum of all these features,
What is original in me
Or other human creatures?"

Goethe cures his originality-measles by irony. In a good-humored self-persiflage he ridicules his own vanity and so rises above the dejecting influence of a truth that to the conceited seems to deprive man of his most cherished dignity, but to the wise is a lesson that teaches him gratitude to and reverence for his ancestors.

The Unity of the Ego-Conception.

But how does the sentiment of unity originate which is involved in the ego-conception?

The unity of our soul is as little as the unity of vision due to the action of an unknown unifying power. The unity of consciousness is imposed upon the organism by the necessity of acting as a unit. It is by no means impossible that a man can think two or three or more things at the same time. This actually happens, when he is unattentive and allows (as we may say) his mind to wander. But if a man allows his mind to wander and think of several things at the same time, he will find that he can think of none of the things which he has in mind with precision. In order to give attention to a thing, he must at one given moment devote his attention to it and to it alone. There is, so far as we can search the soul, no metaphysical unity in our ego which would be a stable and constant identity of one thought, or one state of mind, or one continuous unifying power. There is nothing of the kind. On the contrary, states

of distraction and a dissipation of thought without any unity of mind are by no means an uncommon occurrence. They are states of inattention in which a number of memory-images and sensations float over the soul in dreamy indifference; but such dispositions give way to a concentration of mind under the strain of the dire necessity of life demanding a well-planned action for the sake of our self-preservation.

Different ideas possess a different interest according to the importance they have for us; and we need not add that the same objects arouse different thoughts in different people according to their character.

Uneducated people depend almost exclusively upon their sensations; what is out of sight is out of mind. The higher a man rises, the more will his conception of absent things, recollections of past experiences and expectations of the future, play a part in his mental machinery; and the power of concentration, of directing the mind upon one object, and of keeping it steadily there until the special purpose in view be accomplished is a quality that

characterises the superiority of a strong mind over a weaker one.

There are creatures far below the level of man's intellectuality who are entirely devoid of a unity of soul, since their limbs are psychically and physiologically of equal value. I mean such creatures as the star-fish. The five arms have a mouth in common, but no head that would undertake to assume the leadership. They form a unity by being joined to one another in a circle and connected by nerve-fibres on terms of perfect equality. And yet whenever the need arises these five limbs act in concert, as though they had a head. They assist one another in much the same way as a pack of dingoes, wild hounds, or wolves do, when chasing game. Though there is no leader, they are all ensouled with the same purpose and act accordingly, which produces the impression of the presence of a mysterious power that directs them.

The spirit of solidarity that prevails among hordes of wild beasts, develops in human society into a well-conducted government, and the solidarity of the limbs of a living organ-

ism results in its higher phases in the consciousness of its indivisible oneness which in man forms the corner-stone of his ego.

The Newness of Each New Individual.

While there is no originality in the absolute sense in our inherited qualities, be they bodily structures or the gifts of special talents, we cannot deny that the peculiar mixture—or, as it is commonly called, the idiosyncrasy—of every single human being is individual and unique. Such is the variability of human nature that in spite of the sameness of details, each personality forms a type of its own. All the ingredients are inherited, and if we were omniscient, we could probably trace them to their various sources, but their combination is new in each fresh individual, which adds not a little to the zest of life as every new life opens a new chance of viewing the world from a new standpoint with new opportunities.

A Basis for the Higher Life of the Soul.

We sum up: the ego of our corporeality is a complicated mass of sentiments, unified in

the consciousness of the solidarity of the whole body. The framework of this complex feeling consists of the notions of our bodily organs and their functions gathered by experience and self-observation, not by introspection but through the mutual apperception of the various limbs and sense-organs.

The nature of the sentiments as to our relation to the external world is mainly determined by our bodily constitution. Robust muscles, vigorous lungs, a strong heart, pure blood, a good stomach, hale eyes and otherwise keen senses, but, best of all, an active brain, are important factors in the general tenor of the corporeal ego. In the education of the race, therefore, and in the raising of our children, we must never forget that the bodily constitution is the basis of all, and however much it is true that a mind grown strong will be master of the body and will even when health and strength begin to fail assert its superiority, the easiest way of producing strong minds, steady in purpose, courageous in the battles of life, undaunted by danger and disaster, is by invigorating the

physiological system, of which the corporeal consciousness is but the psychical expression. Physical strength is not as yet moral strength; but the physical life is the root from which the higher spiritual life of man's ego develops.

THE CONTINUITY OF MAN'S PERSONAL RECOLLECTIONS.

The significance of the word "I" is not, however, exhausted by the notion of our corporeality. The most prominent feature in man's ego is the consciousness of a continued identity consisting of a chain of memories which form a more or less complete record of all the main events of his life from the days of early childhood to the present. This consciousness of our temporal existence, of our life's history, is somewhat more spiritual than the notion of our corporeality and in addition, it promises more individuality and a more differentiated selfhood.

Importance of the Name.

Our name becomes associated at the very beginning with this consciousness of our tem-

poral continuity, and the identity of the name contributes not a little to the sentiment of the identity of our person throughout the various stages of our life. Every man enjoys the possession of a name that is individual and no one finds satisfaction in being one of the several Messrs. Brown or Smith who live in the same town and have the same initials. Our name as a rule whenever we meet with it unexpectedly, be it that we hear it pronounced or see it in print or writing, touches us at once to the quick and produces a stir in us; and this excitement sometimes does not abate even in men whose name is constantly before the public.

What an important thing this combination of a few letters is to every one of us and how do people labor and spend money to give it currency and a wide circulation!

What is a name—a mere sound, nothing more. Why should we care to have our name remembered when we are gone? Is not this the height of man's vanity?

Let us not be too quick in condemning the vanity of man's love of having his name men-

tioned with honor and reverence and perpetuated by his fellow-beings. Shakespeare dwells on the futility of a name, as a mere name; and he is right, the mere name is nothing. He says:

> "What's in a name? That which we call a rose
> By any other name would smell as sweet."

That is true in the world of objects, of dumb things, but not in the realm of the mind, not in the soul of man and wherever mental conceptions play a part.

The name that is given to a dish is of great importance. A good name associated with appetising memories, makes a dish as much welcome as when presented in a beautiful form and eaten from an artistic plate on a clean table-cloth. I Inow of some children who could not be prevailed upon to touch the cream that gatheres on milk, because they called it skin and associated it with human skin, peeled off. Names have associations which are not easily obliterated. This is even more true of personal names. Every name stands for a certain personality as its denotation with which the man becomes identified.

The young Goethe, while studying at Strassburg, became acquainted with Herder, who had an unpleasant manner of making himself disagreeable by perpetrating insulting puns. Goethe took offence at a comment that suggested the possibility of his name being derived from the word *Koth*, i. e., dirt, and submitted to such maltreatment only because he felt that intercourse with a clever man, his senior in years and experience, was extremely profitable to his development. He vents his indignation, however, in his *Wahrheit und Dichtung* in these words:

"It was certainly impolite to take this liberty with my name: for the proper name of a man is not like a mantle which hangs about him and at which people may pull and tear, but like a perfectly fitting dress,—nay, it is like his skin covering him completely, and one cannot scrape or scratch it without hurting him."

No doubt, there is much vanity connected with a man's love of his own name, and many ridiculous things happen that show it. There are several book companies making fortunes out of it, and it seems to pay them better than a gold mine. They publish encyclopædias of

great men, or of special states or towns, and send out their agents to men whom they expect to pay for the glory of having their names and pictures published. If you are a merchant or tradesman, they want you to appear among successful business men; if you are a surgeon, you must be ranked with the famous physicians, etc., etc.; but woe to you if you have written a book, or published a poem in the local newspaper: they are bound to mention you among the prominent authors of the day, "not yet known to the public at large as your merits deserve." A business man of good common sense will perhaps sternly resist the temptation of becoming famous, but a poet—as a rule, for I do not mean to say that there are no exceptions—will fall an easy prey to such schemes. The bait is too tempting!

An immediatised duke of Brunswick, who had done nothing whatever to deserve being remembered by later generations, except that he had inherited an old name and a large fortune, left on his death several million francs to the city of Geneva, Switzerland, on the condition that a monument be erected to him in a prom-

inent place. The city accepted the undertaking, probably not without misgivings, and there the statue of the duke still stands, a witness to the vanity of an ambitious man who had not sense enough to bequeath his money for a noble and useful purpose. His name might now be mentioned with gratitude by many, instead of being the laughing stock of the foreign traveller who looks up with astonishment to the fool who has erected a statue to himself.

A Record of Life's History.

The consciousness of our continued identity is simply the record of our life's history. There is no true identity in the nature of one's personality, for that is exactly the thing that changes. The baby becomes a boy, the boy a man, the man passes through various phases, he falls a prey to the calamities of old age until he dies, leaving his bodily system to its inevitable dissolution. Saul before the conversion and Paul after the conversion are the same man; yet the nature of the personality is changed. The identity is the identity

of the term "I," including the name (but even that may be changed) and the continuity of the life. He who persecuted the Christians and had Stephen stoned is the same person as he who swooned on the way to Damascus and later on preached Jesus the Crucified. Paul himself knew that he had become another than his old "I" that had died: it has been crucified with Christ, and he has acquired a new soul which is no one else than Christ who has been resurrected in him. These are facts of life which naturally are of great interest, for if by little changes in the make-up of a soul we can change its entire attitude in life, we possess a power to change men which in its importance and on account of its application to all the fields of human life, the education of children, and the reformation of society, will be more wonderful than magic. We see that the great miracle is not that the successive actions of the same body are referred to the same personality, but that new experiences can arouse new ideas, new thoughts, new hopes in a man, and that by a broader

insight into certain truths the whole attitude of a man towards the world may be changed.

An Identity of Form.

The difficulties of the problem of the identity of our personality have been artificially increased by lovers of the mysterious in order to render the nature of personality incomprehensible.

Every thought, every sensation, every experience is in its physiological aspect a nervous commotion of a definite form, leaving a trace of this form behind which, when again resuscitated through some irritation to active sentiency, revives in the form of a recollection. Memory is, as we have seen, simply the psychical aspect of the preservation of physiological forms, and there is no greater mystery in the personal recollections which constitute the consciousness of our temporal development in the shape of our life's history, than in any other memory. Its unity and continuity are the inevitable result of the unity of the bodily system and of the continuity of its life.

It is a characteristic feature of the historical consciousness of everybody's life, that the idea of one's personality is always complete. The whole life up to the present moment appears as a unity as much so as does the consciousness of the solidarity of all the limbs of our body and the unity of our ego-conception.

We must here call attention to the fact that the abiding in man is not the substance of which he is made, not the material of which his body is built up, but the form. The substance passes through the structures which make him such as he is, and if there were not a constant preservation of form, man would never have risen into existence.

Having acquired our knowledge through the channels of our senses, we are apt to exaggerate the importance of matter and the most common form of a wrong metaphysicism consists in the belief that matter is a thing in itself which is endowed with qualities and assumes various forms. Form is supposed to be something that passes away and is of no account, and the substance or the material of which a thing consists is regarded as essen-

tial. However useful this way of looking at phenomena may be in chemistry, where matter is the object of investigation, its truth is very relative, and the notion becomes positively false and misleading when we inquire into the nature of phenomena which are essentially forms and relations; and we must always bear in mind that forms, proportions, and relations are not indifferent accidents but realities—in fact they are the chief and dominant facts of life.

Man's existence as a sentient and rational being is a matter of form. Our ego-consciousness does not result from an identity of substance but depends purely and simply upon an identity of structure. We are not a heap of material atoms that assume a certain form, but we are a form in the flux of living substance that assimilates new matter and throws off the waste. The author of the Faerie Queene says:

> "For of the soule the bodie forme doth take,
> For soule is forme, and doth the bodie make."*

* Spenser, *An Hymne in Honour of Beautie*, line 132.

Reproduction of Tradition.

The notion of our life's history, the sum total of our recollections, is regarded as the characteristic feature of our personality and wherever the unity of this series is broken up through a morbid condition of the brain, our psychologists speak of the diseases of personality. A person whose memories of the past are either totally or in part wiped out from consciousness, has no choice but to start life over again and to begin a new series which in itself will form as much a complete unity as does any chain of personal recollections. An interesting case of not infrequent occurrence is the alternate reappearance of the original personality and the disappearance of the newly-started series of recollections, which is called the second personality. Thus it happens that two souls with different aptitudes, of a different character and possessing a different chain of recollections, the one knowing nothing whatever of the other but being rooted in the same subconscious conditions of the corporeal personality, live in the same body and come

alternately to the front, the changes becoming the more rapid the more the patient approaches his final dissolution.

* * *

We found no originality in the ingredients that make up the bodily system and its dispositions. Shall we be more fortunate in our analysis of the constituents of our temporal personality? How is the character of a child formed, and how are the inherited talents developed?

Professor Wernicke describes the formation of a man's personality as follows:*

"The family life of the parents undoubtedly stamps a definite character upon the child and upon its spiritual personality. The consciousness of one's personality comprises all those qualities which result, according to the same law as instinct, from the social atmosphere in which the individual grows up and lives."

The language itself which one learns in childhood must be regarded as an important factor in the formation of personality. Says Wernicke:

* *Grundriss der Psychiatrie*, I., p. 59.

"Together with language, the entire spiritual possession of the adult, not of isolated individuals but of uncounted generations whose spiritual heirs we are, is transferred upon the child's brain in a definite logical order and arrangement. . . . . The well adjusted modes of logical thought, all intricate mental functions have, undoubtedly, their main root in the art of language which is transmitted to us ready-made."

Apparently, what is true of the preservation of form in the individual holds good also as to the race. The identity of myself as reflected in my ego-consciousness is possible because the same structures representing the same kind of thought and sentiment are preserved in the metabolism of our bodily system. The multiplication of cells is a reproduction of the form of the cells from which they grow; and the new cells inherit, as it were, the souls of their parent cells and perform the same functions. In the same way, the whole life of mankind presents a continuity which is characterised by a preservation of form, involving a reproduction of the same kind of thoughts and aspirations,—or simply a reincarnation of the same souls.

Here, accordingly, we are again confronted with the truth that our personality is a reproduction. Our character, our habits, our modes of thought are formed by the example of those under whose care we grow up. The man who hankers for originality will find little satisfaction in this truth, but he who overcomes his disappointment may acquire a better treasure than the doubtful guarantee of a justification of his vanity; he may, by having the cream of the life of his predecessors concentrated in him, become a genius, a thinker, an artist, a poet, as did Goethe.

Goethe, full of native vigor, was undoubtedly, in the period of his youthful immaturity, filled with the thought of being somebody in distinction to others, a self of its own kind, a new star that appeared on the horizon of mankind; but true greatness always rises above vanity. Goethe describes his experience of being disillusioned of his ambition in a poem which breathes the same sentiment as the lines we have quoted above; but whereas the former poem refers to the inherited ingredients of his soul, the present one declares that

the make-up of his life's history is simply the product of tradition. His personality is a reproduction of the past.

The poem reads as follows:

"When eagerly a child looks round,
In his father's house his shelter is found.
His ear, beginning to understand,
Imbibes the speech of his native land.

"Whatever his own experiences are,
He hears of other things afar.
Example affects him; he grows strong and steady
Yet finds the world complete and ready.

"This is prized, and that praised with much ado;
He wishes to be somebody too.
How can he work and woo, how fight and frown?
For everything has been written down.

"Nay, worse, it has appeared in print,
The youth is baffled but takes the hint.
It dawns on him, now, more and more
He is what others have been before."

A further explanation of the same thought is found in these lines:

"Would from tradition break away.
Original I'd be!
Yet the feat so grand, to my dismay,
Greatly discomfits me.
The honor of being an autochthon
Would be a great ambition,

But strange enough, I have to own,
I am myself tradition."

Self-cognition, according to Goethe, can be attained only by dispelling the illusion of the absolute and independent existence of a self. Goethe says:

"'Cognise thyself,' 'tis said. How does self-knowledge pay?
When I cognise myself, *I* must at once away."

MAN IDENTIFIED WITH HIS IDEALS.

The Ideal Self.

There would be no originality at all, were our ego not possessed of a very inconvenient quality, the consciousness of our wants. Hunger is the stimulus that goads sentient creatures to look out and acquire forethought. Hunger sharpens the wit. All living creatures owe the acquisition of their virtues to the needs of life, and in the same way, the sentiment of our short-comings is a positive factor in the formation of our future. They determine our desires, our longings, our aspirations, our ideals.

Rückert says:

"An ideal of oneself ensouleth every mind,
Ere it be realised, the soul no peace can find."

The negative qualities of that which we do not possess, of that which we are not but should like to be, of that which we know not but wish to know; of that which we have not accomplished but are anxious to accomplish, are the most important parts of our soul. Our aspirations, too, have been transmitted to us from our ancestors and nothing, indeed, is cherished more dearly and impressed upon the young mind with greater seriousness than our ideals, be they of a moral or intellectual or purely affectionate nature.

The ideals of our soul, we do not hesitate to say, are the strongest and most irresistible forces that are in us. They are comparable to the heart-leaves of a plant, to the buds that are sprouting, to the growth of spring shoots in which the new life thrives. As the tiny rootlets of a tree break rocks to pieces, so the yearnings of man, be they religious or patriotic or personal, instigate him to the utmost to overcome all obstacles, and the cases are by no means rare in which men—even those

who do not believe in an immortality of the soul—willingly and gladly lay down their lives for their ideals.

Ideals Predetermined.

The soul is not a finite being limited to what it is; the soul is capable of growth and its potentialities are infinite. The ideals of life are unlimited, and every one has his chance of realising his part of them. There are ideals of science and invention, of success in practical life, of enhancing the comforts of life, of diminishing pain, and making the artistic taste more refined, of preserving the good of past generations as embodied in institutions and customs, of reforming social evils, rendering possible a greater and ever greater actualisation of justice, etc., etc. Here, if anywhere, is a chance for a man to become something of his own, to be original, to acquire an individuality and particular selfhood that would raise him above the crow of the average reproductions of the commonplace specimens of the human race.

True, very true; and with the advance

of civilisation the chances of accomplishing something that shall possess a special worth, either on account of its newness, or through opening and widening the resources of life, are growing. But mark that the chances of going astray are assuredly not less varied. It is easy enough to acquire a particular individuality by turning a fool or by committing a crime. The possibilities of error and sin surround us everywhere while the advance of truth, of righteousness, and of a general usefulness can proceed only on a straight and narrow path. All deviations both to the right and to the left are aberrations.

Suppose now a man to be a genius, suppose him to be an inventor, or discoverer, or poet, or a leader in Church or State. What then is the nature of his peculiar soul-idiosyncrasy, if not the realisation of some of the eternal laws of existence. Kepler discovered the three laws that bear his name. They existed before him, and his peculiar merit consists in the fact that with the knowledge that had been handed down to him from the preceding ages he was able to find the truth and

to state it in exact formulas. Nor can the inventor construct anything that is absolutely his own. The inventor, also, is merely a discoverer; he finds a method by which something can be accomplished. The conception of a wheel, of a needle, of a lever, of a pulley, of a watch, of a steam engine, are discoveries; they are inventions in the literal sense of the world, that is, something that is found out; and the same is true of moral laws and wise sayings—including the expression of human sentiment in poetry.

The poet appears to be the most original and most independently creative genius of all; yet it is to be borne in mind that the success of a poet depends upon the fact that he expresses sentiments that find an echo in the hearts of the people. The poet who is original, in the true sense of the word, will prove a failure. His songs will thrill the people only if he makes himself the mouth-piece of their feelings and reduces to a definite shape that which is dimly in everybody's mind.

The doctrines of Christianity teach us that Jesus is the Christ, and the Christ is the in-

carnation of the logos. This means that the prototype is the eternal truth. We have no reason to quarrel with the philosophical significance of the Logos doctrine; on the contrary, we would apply the same idea to the soul of every great man who has become the incarnation of some special verity, or principle whose home is the divine realm of eternality.

* * *

Thus we have seen that every man starts in life as a reproduction of his ancestry. He acquires the quintessence of their souls through education and then starts in life to work out the ideals which he has made his own. We may freely grant that man, considered as a separate individual, is nothing of himself, that he has received even his ideals and the power to work them out to higher completion. He is nothing but the impulse of former aspirations carried on to new fields of work. Nevertheless, if he does not bury his talents, the moment he puts them to usury and makes them bring returns a new start is

made which is rightly called his own and justly bears his name.

This part of man, the realisation of his ideals, is the highest summit of his soul-life, and this is the most individual and most characteristic feature of his personality. All the rest is the foundation only from which he starts; here he becomes himself. The foundation may be more massive than his ideal self which is only a superadded portion, but it is the result of his own exertion; it is that which distinguishes him among his fellow-beings, it is a new revelation of which he has made himself the medium.

Communism of Soul-Life.

There is no individual in the absolute sense. We are not separate beings, distinct and original; we are parts of a greater whole, and in this greater whole our destiny, our antecedents as well as our future, is encompassed. Only he to whom by a habit of thought the old view of individuality has been endeared can see harm in the breakdown of the limits that separate us from the life of others. The

truth is, that when we learn to recognise our spiritual identity with the soul-life outside the boundary of our individual existence, our soul broadens and we feel a thrill of joy at the apprehension that we are infinitely greater than we thought. He who shrinks in dismay from this broader conception of the soul may be sure that he has not as yet understood the significance of its truth.

The nature of all soul-life, intellectual as well as emotional, is founded upon communism. No growth of ideas for any length of time is possible without communication. It is the exchange of thought and mutual criticism that produces intellectual progress. And it is the warmth of a sympathetic heart which kindles similar feelings in others.

With every sentence that you speak to others, a part of your soul is transferred to them. And in their souls your words may fall like seeds. Some may fall by the wayside, where the fowls come and devour them up. Others may fall upon a rock where they have not much earth. Some may fall among thorns which will choke them. Yet some of

them will fall upon good ground: and the words will take root and grow and bring forth fruit, some a hundred-fold, some sixty-fold, some thirty-fold.

A CONTINUATION OF THE PAST.

In delineating the constitution of man's soul, we have answered the question: Whence do we come? We are the continuation of the soul-life under whose parentage and general care we have taken our start, and represent the sum total of the endeavors of our ancestry since times immemorial, when at the dawn of creation the first speck of living matter began its venturesome career—

> "Not from the blank Inane emerged the soul:
> A sacred treasury it is of dreams
> And deeds that built the present from the past,
> Adding thereto its own experiences.
> Ancestral lives are seeing in mine eyes,
> Their hearing listeneth within mine ears,
> And in my hand their strength is plied again.
> Speech came, a rich consignment from the past,
> Each word aglow with wondrous spirit life,
> Thus building up my soul of myriad souls."

WHITHER?

THE DISSOLUTION OF THE BODY AND THE PRESERVATION OF THE SOUL.

ALL nations have invented myths and dogmas which reflect the conviction that our soul shall remain when our life has reached its consummation. The allegories in which this doctrine is couched, if taken literally, are to a great extent untenable and objectionable, but we would not hesitate to say that the belief in immortality is in itself true enough and cannot lose its importance on account of the superstitions which it assumes in unscientific minds.

Whither do we fare?

Apparently our body is dissolved at death and disintegrated into its elements. Feeling becomes extinct in it, thought discontinues, and all activity ceases. Is not then our life

spent for nothing? For, if we are gone and nothing is left of our bodily organisation, what is the use whether we were good or bad, whether we were a genius or a fool, whether our existence was idled away in empty pleasures or filled with great and noble deeds? Is it not quite indifferent whether or not later generations praise or blame us, whether we become a blessing to posterity or a curse?

But we have learned to distinguish between our material make-up and its form, between body and spirit, between the ego and the soul.

> "The 'I' is but a name to clothe withal
> The clustered mass that now my being forms.
> Take not the symbol for reality—
> The transient for th' eterne. Mine ego, lo!
> 'Tis but my spirit's scintillating play
> This fluctuant moment of eternities
> That now are crossing where my heart's blood beats.
> I was not, am, and soon will pass. But never
> My soul shall cease; the breeding ages aye
> Shall know its life. All that the past bequeathed,
> And all that life hath added unto me,
> This shall endure in immortality,"

The explanation of the nature of our soul and its Whence suggests the answer to the question, Whither? so anxiously asked by

millions of quivering lips. The vanity fair of life which contributes so much to produce the ego-illusion becomes most apparent in death, but when the vessel is broken, its contents are not spilled to evaporate into hazy clouds.

In order to know what shall become of us, we must ask ourselves, What has become of our ancestors? Their bodies have crumbled into dust and nothing is left of them, nothing, except those life-forms which have been transmitted to later generations and have finally built up our own soul. Yet these life-forms are their souls. All that which proved good is treasured up and preserved in the continued life of the race. Their bodies are gone, but their souls remain.

"Life's every throb and thrill
Of ages past
Remains for good and ill
A living presence still
That aye will last.
Our fathers are not dead,
Their thoughts pulse in our head,
Their sentiments warm our heart,
Their souls ne'er part."

PERSONAL IMMORTALITY.

We distinguish between individuality and personality.

By individuality we understand the corporeal life which takes its start at the moment of conception, enters the world at birth, covers a definite span of time, and is dissolved in death. By personality we understand the form of life, of thought, and of sentiment, in contrast to its material concreteness. Personality is that which makes us such as we are, which constitutes our character and determines the greater or lesser worth and dignity of our individuality.

Personality and individuality are not two separate entities, but two abstractions of the same reality. Each term emphasises a different aspect. The former comprises those features which change an individual into a person of a definite character, while the latter denotes their bodily actualisation in material concreteness. Both terms are synonymous, being at times interchangeable, but forming a contrast when we distinguish between the essential

and accidental of man's life, between that which is permanent and that which is transient.

Our corporeal individuality is dissolved in death, but not our personality. Our existence after death, far from being a dissolution into the All, consists in this that we are gathered to our fathers, and in this state all our personal features are preserved. As sure as the law of cause and effect is true, so sure is the continuance of soul-life even after the death of the individual according to the law of the preservation of form. It is not non-existence but a condition of intense usefulness, a higher kind of life, the grandeur of which suggested to George Eliot this noble prayer:

> "O may I join the choir invisible
> Of those immortal dead who live again
> In minds made better by their presence: live
> In pulses stirr'd to generosity,
> In deeds of daring rectitude, in scorn
> For miserable aims that end with self,
> In thoughts sublime that pierce the night like stars,
> And with their mild persistence urge man's search
> To vaster issues.
> "This is life to come,
> Which martyr'd men have made more glorious
> For us who strive to follow.

"May I reach
That purest heaven, be to other souls
The cup of strength in some great agony,
Enkindle generous ardor, feed pure love,
Beget the smiles that have no cruelty,
Be the sweet presence of a good diffus'd,
And in diffusion ever more intense!
So shall I join the choir invisible
Whose music is the gladness of the world."

This view of immortality is as obvious as it is undeniable even by the bigoted unbeliever and the most rabid sceptic. The sole difficulty which the average man encounters is his lack of appreciation of the importance of form. Forms are not non-entities, not shadows, or phantasms; forms are real. Our personality becomes possible through a continuance of our life-forms; and these life-forms are preserved beyond death. Our immortality, accordingly, is as real as is our identity in the changes of life. The latter is no more nor less absolute than the former, and as the former is generally satisfactory to mankind, why should we find fault with the former? He who comprehends the reality of form will certainly know that it is all we may expect, and we cannot ask for anything better.

IN COMMUNION WITH THE WHOLE.

The truth that every personality is distinctly definite in its character and will remain distinctly itself after death, does not imply that it is a separate entity which might have originated or could exist in seclusion. There is no isolation in the domain of spirit, and the life of the soul is rooted in communism.

Every spiritual giving is a gaining; it is a taking possession of other peoples' minds. It is an expansion, a transplantation of our thoughts, a psychic growth beyond the narrow limits of our individual existence into other souls; it is a rebuilding, a reconstruction of our own souls or of parts of our own souls, in other souls. It is a transference of mind. Every conversation is an exchange of souls. Those whose souls are "flat, stale, and unprofitable," cannot be expected to overflow with deep thought. But those who are rich in spiritual treasures will not, as misers, keep them for themselves. For out of the abundance of the heart the mouth speaketh,

and spiritual treasures are not wasted when imparted; they are not lost, but put out on usury, and will multiply and thus bring great reward, although the reward be not a material profit to ourselves.

Good and noble ideas, instructive truths, warm words of good-will and sympathy will accomplish great things. But evil words possess a similar power. Strong characters will hear and reject evil words, but weak minds will be poisoned by them. It is the great consequence that speech draws with it, which demands that before uttering it we should weigh every word. Every idle word that men speak, says Christ, they shall give account thereof in the day of judgment. And the day of judgment takes place now and here.

The communism of soul-life is not limited to the present generation; it extends to the past as well as to the future. The present generation of humanity is like the present generation of live corals who have grown from, and rest upon, the work of former generations. The ancestors of the corals now on the surface lived in the shallow places of the

ocean, where the sun made the waters warm and the surf afforded them sufficient food; and when in the lapse of time through terrestrial changes the bottom on which they had settled, sank slowly deeper and deeper, they built higher and higher, and in this way they managed to keep near the surface. The branches in the cold, deep waters are now dead; yet they furnish a solid basis to the coral life above, where the sun shines and the currents of the surf pass to and fro.

If the corals could think and speak, I wonder whether the living generation on the surface would not rail at the corals in the cold deep below! At least the present human generation very often proves ungrateful to its predecessors. Those who feel the necessity of progress, who wish humanity to remain uppermost and to rise higher, are apt to overlook the merits of their ancestors; they observe that the ideas of former generations are antiquated and do no longer fit into the present time. Thus they brand the old views as superstitions and forget that the views of the present generation have developed from

the old, and that they stand upon their ancestors' work. It would seem as if the dead corals in the cold, dreary deep must have been always unfit for life; yet there was a time when their coral homes thrilled with life; and so there was a time when the superstitions of to-day were true science and true religion although they are now dreary and cold.

Where is the coral life of the past? Has it disappeared? No, it continues, and its continuation is the coral life of to-day. So the humanity of former generations has not gone. The life of humanity still persists, and it is present in every one of us.

We may compare humanity to a coral plant. The single corals are connected among themselves through the canals in the branches from which they grow. No one of them can prosper without supplying its neighbors with the superabundance of its prosperity. The main difference is that the communism of soul-life is much closer and more intimate than that of the coral plant, and the thinker who freely gives away his spiritul treasures, unlike the giver of material gifts, does not

lose: he is rather the gainer, for spiritual possessions grow in importance the more profusely they are imparted. The commoner they are, the more powerful they become.

The sacrament of the Lord's Supper symbolises a spiritual fact—the holy communion of mankind. But remember that the eating of the bread and the drinking of the wine are allegorical; the actual communion consists in an exchange of souls which is done through the vehicle of speech, the word, the logos.

Our spiritual life is through others, with others, and in others. The more we are conscious of the communism of soul-life, the more our heart expands beyond the narrow limits of our selfhood, the more conscious shall we become of our immortality. Says Schiller in one of his *Xenions:*

> "Art thou afraid friend of death and thou longest for life everlasting?
> Live as a part of the whole; when thou art gone it remains."

TIME AND ITS INDESTRUCTIBILITY.

We have learned that there is no individual in the absolute sense; every individual is

such as it is through its connexion with the race, and its personality is determined by the past as well as the present conditions that surround it. The individual, therefore, is a phase in the entire soul-life of mankind; it is temporal and partakes of the transiency as well as the immortality that attaches to time. The individual proper, i. e., the bodily element of man, is continually passing away; but that which constitutes his personality, remains constant. The form of life is preserved.

The present is always the continuation of the past; it is the past itself in that form in which it has moulded itself.

> "Not dead, perfected only is the past;
> And ever from the darkness of the grave
> It rises to rejuvenated life."

And the future again is a continuation of the present; it is the present, such as it transforms its own past.

It is the nature of time to be transient. Every minute, every day passes away; yet the significance of every moment remains a factor in building up the future. If the nature of time were mere transiency, then the

moment would be supreme and the future would have no right to be considered by the present. But the medal has its reverse. The other side of the shield of time is the immortalisation of the moment.

The transiency of time is a comfort to the weary and sorrow-laden, to those who almost break down under the burdens of life or bear the brunt of the battle:

> "Come what come may,
> Time and the hour runs through the roughest day."

The doing of a deed passes away with the moment, so does all suffering, all laboring, and all anxiety and tribulation; but the deed itself remains. The hours spent in study or useful labor are not wasted. Every act, every thought, every sentiment remains a living presence with us for our life-time. Poems that we learn by heart stay with us. The time of conning them passes, but the verses remain alive in us as a part of our soul. And as the individual hours are treasured up in our soul, so the personalities of the past live on in the present generation, which closely considered is but their own life reproduced

and carried over to new fields of broader activity.

The truth as to time and its indestructibility may be expressed in another form thus: There are not three times: past, present, and future; there is one time only, viz., the present, and the present is always. The past is that which has made the present such as it is; it is the factor of the present, its determinant, and the future is the direction of the present, the work which it accomplishes, the outcome determined. It is obvious that in a certain sense the present alone is real. The reality of the past and of the future consists in their being the two aspects of the present, the opposite poles in which it differentiates itself, its whence and its whither.

In the same sense reality exists in eternal indestructibility. The soul exists in an eternal present of which past and future are integral parts. It may go to sleep, but it will wake up again. The unthinking animal is limited to the present as such, the thinking man becomes conscious of its two outlooks, its whence and its whither. And the philosopher,

again, learns to consider the whence and whither of life as one and the same reality, unified under the aspect of eternity.

Eternity is the polar star in the heavens above us which helps us to find our bearings in life. Says Goethe:

> "Drop all of transiency
> Whate'er be its claim,
> Ourselves to immortalise
> That is our aim."

The same poet-philosopher characterises the specifically human of man as the power of giving permanence to that which is temporary.

> "Man can accomplish—
> Man alone—the impossible,
> He discriminates,
> Chooses, and judges.
> To the fleeting moment
> He giveth duration."

We might as well call the specifically human the divine, for man can only by a recognition of the eternal, the universal, the Logos, preserve the consciousness of a continuity between the present and the future, and thereby "give duration to the fleeting moment."

THE IMMORTALITY OF IDEAS.

In the same way as the functions of the bodily organism are immortalised by heredity, so the treasures of civilisation are handed down from generation to generation in an uninterrupted chain of tradition. Ideas possess a kind of personality of their own. They originate by a combination of other ideas, grow more or less complex, become more and more perfected and prove themselves immortal beings. They migrate from brain to brain, from mind to mind, from generation to generation; they spread and become "in their diffusion ever more intense."

Take for instance the invention of the wheel. The first thought of it may have been suggested by the sight of a rolling trunk. The primitive wheel was a cylinder. Then the axle was invented; and perhaps much later on, the hub. The cylindrical roller changed into joined discs, and the discs gave way to the wheel with tire-encircled spokes.

Thus the waggon-wheel came to a certain

perfection; but the idea of a wheel started on a new career with the invention of machinery, and now we have the development of cog-wheels, fly-wheels, balance-wheels, eccentrics and then the crank, the favorite child of the eccentric. With the invention of steam, the wheel again enters into a new field of greater usefulness, and throughout the history of the wheel the thought of that unknown genius who invented it in the pre-historic age of primitive mankind, still lives on.

The same is true of every other invention, the pin, the needle, the pot, the hammer, the drill, the bow, the brush, the pen, etc., etc.

Nor are the more impalpable ideas less important: good advices, moral lessons, noble sentiments—all these spiritual treasures are the soul of mankind. They grow and develop in a continuous historical evolution, preserving an identity of the fundamental idea throughout all changes and complications. Ideas are not non-entities, not airy nothings, mere sounds and empty words, *flatus vocis*, as the nominalists called them; they are realities, spiritual realities, and indeed the highest

treasures in our possession. They are the stuff of which our souls have been made.

THE SPIRIT-EMPIRE.

Personalities are built up of ideas and partake with them of the same immortality,—an immortality which with the progress of invention and by the increase of culture becomes ever more assured.

With the invention of writing, thoughts gain a stability which they lacked before. Hence the history of mankind begins with the origin of speech, but the history of civilisation is ushered in by the invention of writing.

Modern history does not begin with political events, but with the invention of printing. It was printing which made a diffusion of knowledge possible, which gave birth to the Reformation and bred the soul of a Columbus whose happy combination of science with daring prompted him to venture out West in search for the East.

As to the importance of books and the soul that animates these little black symbols on white sheets of paper John Milton uttered the

following classical sentences, spoken in defence of the liberty of thought and denouncing the barbarous indifference with which the Government would suppress books. He said in the *Areopagitica:*

"I deny not but that it is of greatest concernment, in the church and commonwealth, to have a vigilant eye how books demean themselves, as well as men; and thereafter to confine, imprison, and do sharpest justice on them as malefactors. For books are not absolutely dead things, but do contain a potency of life in them to be as active as that soul was whose progeny they are; nay, they do preserve as in a vial the purest efficacy and extraction of that living intellect that bred them. I know they are as lively, and as vigorously productive, as those fabulous dragon's teeth, and, being sown up and down, may chance to spring up armed men.

"And yet, on the other hand, unless wariness be used, as good almost kill a man as kill a good book: who kills a man kills a reasonable creature, God's image; but he who destroys a good book kills reason itself, kills the image of God, as it were, in the eye. Many a man lives a burden to the earth; but a good book is the precious life-blood of a master-spirit, embalmed and treasured up on purpose to a life beyond life. It is true, no age can restore a life, whereof,

perhaps, there is no great loss; and revolutions of ages do not oft recover the loss of a rejected truth, for the want of which whole nations fare the worse."

Gustave Freytag expresses the same sentiments in similar language:

"There remains attached to every human work something of the soul of the man who has produced it, and a book contains between its covers the actual spirit of the author. The real value of a man to others —the best portion of his life—remains in this form for the generations that follow, and perhaps for the farthermost future. Moreover, not only those who write a good book, but those whose lives and actions are portrayed in it, actually continue to live among us. We converse with them as with friends and opponents; we admire or contend with, love or hate them, not less than if they dwelt bodily among us. . . .

"No one who has written a book has of himself become what he is; every one stands on the shoulders of his predecessor; all that was produced before his time has helped to form his life and soul. Again, what he has produced has in some sort formed other men, and thus his soul has passed to later times. In this way, the contents of books form one great spirit-empire on earth, and all who now write, live and nourish themselves on the souls of the past generations. From this point of view the soul of mankind

is an immeasurable unity, which comprises every one who ever thus lived and worked, as well as those who breathe and produce new works at present. The soul which the generations of the past felt as their own, has been and is daily transmigrating into others. What is written to-day may to-morrow become the possession of thousands of strangers. Those who have long ago ceased to exist in the body, continue to live in new forms here on earth, and daily revive in thousands of others."

The conception of mankind as a great spiritual unity, an empire of souls, led Auguste Comte to the strange notion of worshipping humanity in the place of God. We cannot approve of the ritual, which is too much an imitation of the Romanism to which he was accustomed, but we appreciate his sentiments. And is not the proposition to deify mankind simply an inversion of the belief in the incarnation of the Logos? If we call the latter the God-man, we may call the former the man-God.

THE BLENDING OF SOULS.

The spirit empire of mankind is like unto a temple that is in building, whose stones are

human souls. Each stone retains its own shape and is a little unit in itself, yet serves at the same time as an integral part of the whole structure. Thus every personality remains itself and loses nothing of its peculiar character or idiosyncrasy; and yet all of them are welded into an indissoluble union,—a union more intimate than chemical combinations, which are the most complete blending of substances that is possible at all in the world of bodily existence.

If lovers desire to be united, they cannot ask for a closer fusion of their souls than is actually produced in their children; and how wondrously are friends and foes united in the souls of later generations into a systematic coöperation. The feuds of former ages are composed. In fiction the Montagues and Capulets shake hands over the dead bodies of their children, but in history the souls of the bitterest enemies are welded into one and live on in the higher unison of the spiritual harmony which is the music of God's revelation on earth.

Our souls are the trysting place of former

souls, and the worth of a man depends upon the guests whom he has received into the home of his personality, whether they are Socrates or Lycon, Plato or Prodicus, the philosopher or the sophist, he who aspires upward or he who clings to the clod, Jesus or Judas.

A comprehension of the unity of life will only serve to render us reverent, serious, and cheerful. It brings home to us the obligations under which we are to the past; it makes us feel the full weight of our responsibility in the building up of future generations and will at the same time give us confidence in the days of trial. The sun sets in the evening, but tomorrow will be another day. When a champion of justice falls in battle, his cause is not defeated. The final judgment is yet to be spoken.

IT THINKS.

Whenever ideas, in their progress through generations, take root in a new individual, they enter into relations with other ideas, in some such way as a number of threads may be gathered up in one knot, whence they re-

issue in all directions for a renewed distribution. The knot is the individual and the cluster of its threads is aglow with consciousness. In the interlaced network of the soul of mankind, every knot is an ego, and every ego is in the habit of regarding the threads that pass through its twist as its own. We are wont to say, "*I* have these ideas; *I* hold these views; this is *my* opinion;" and this thought "*I*" is bloated up to an importance that is apt to distort the dimensions of things and to show their relation to our own existence in a wrong light. It is much better and much truer to say, "This idea has taken hold of me; the thought has grown on me; I have arrived at the conclusion," etc.

Philosophy in a certain period of its development is given to a reification of abstractions which is the mythology of language taken seriously. As the sky, the sun, the storm, the zephir; and then war, life and death, health and disease, love and wisdom, were supposed to be personal beings by polytheists, so, in the metaphysical period, thinkers and scientists speak of "things in themselves," and

treat them as essences which have an existence in and by themselves. This metaphysical method reaches its climax in the ego-illusion which is practically a reification of the word "I," as a being in itself.

Mankind as a whole has not as yet emerged from this period of metaphysicism but moves in the transitional stage of agnosticism, which is still metaphysical, holding that we know phenomena only, and that things in themselves are unknown and unknowable. According to the agnostic philosopher, the problems of life, of the soul, and of the soul's destiny cannot be solved.

Psychology as a science is just freeing itself from the shackles of metaphysicism, and the thought that the ego as an independent being is an illusion of the mind becomes more and more recognised.

Dr. Lichtenberg, a very ingenious writer of the end of the eighteenth century has indicated the characteristic feature of the new psychology by the proposition of introducing the impersonal pronoun "it" in place of the customary "I." He says:

"We become conscious of certain concepts or ideas which do not depend upon us, and of other ideas which, as we suppose, do depend upon us. But where is the limit between the former and the latter? We are aware of nothing but the existence of our sensations, perceptions, and ideas. We should say, "It thinks," just as well as we say, "It lightens," or, "It rains.' In saying *cogito*, the philosopher goes too far if he translates it, '*I think.*'"

The idea contained in this short passage must be digested, before we can hope to understand the process of thinking, for it is indeed the leading principle of modern psychology. Modern psychology looks upon the ego-consciousness not as the cause, but as the product, of thought. The ego-onsciousness appears to be a simple and elementary fact, but it is a very intricate and complex phenomenon, the ultimate constituents of which are sensations. And even these sensations are not simple; they also in their turn are the effects of a wonderful complication of innumerable causes.

The sentient reflex machinery of our body is a reproduction of the life of our ancestors. It receives impressions and has the thoughts

of parents and educators stamped upon its constitution. The very word "I" originates by imitation, and now this word assumes dictatorship and behaves as a sovereign king; but it is a usurper. We imagine *we* think. But thoughts arise in us according to irrefragable laws. *We* do not produce ideas, but ideas produced in the cerebral processes of a brain become conscious, and thus *they* produce *us*.

St. Paul is not the originator of the gospel of crucifixion; the idea of the crucified Saviour seized him in spite of himself and changed the persecutor of the Nazarenes into a Christian apostle.

But is the ego nothing? By no means! The ego is not anything in itself; but considering it as representing the whole personality of a man, it is as real as is the knot in a network of fibres, where they are twisted into a new and original combination. The ego in itself is unreal, but it represents man's personality; and man's personality is real.

While the traditional expression "I think" is wrong when interpreted in the sense of the antiquated psychological metaphys-

icism, it is (as is the case with almost all popular sayings) quite appropriate if used in the popular sense, where "I" stands for the speaker's person in contrast to others. There is a great difference between the various speakers. While it is not the ego-conception that does the thinking, the personality in which "it thinks" contains the determinants of the result. The worth of the personality depends upon the ideas and impulses which enter into its make-up, and the "I think so" has weight only if backed by principles of honesty and justice, scrupulous truthfulness, clearness of thought, correctness and precision in statement as well as critique and method in arrangement. If the term "I" represents an authority on the subject, the statement has another weight than if made by Tom, Dick, or Harry.

The notion "I" has as good a sense if it is not understood in the old signification of an independent ego, as has for instance the term "sunrise," which closely considered is also an antiquated expression since the acceptance of the Copernican system.

A HIGHER CONCEPTION OF THE SELF.

People frequently say, "We do not care what our souls may accomplish when they reappear in other people, whether they shall prove blessings or curses; for we can no longer recognise our identity. We do not mind what our ideas will accomplish when they have been transferred to others, to our contemporaries, or to future generations; for then our thoughts have ceased to be ours; they have become foreign to us. And whether posterity will bless or curse our memory, is a matter of utter indifference if our individuality has been dissolved."

They may say so; but if they will honestly analyse their own sentiments, they can soon find out that they are mistaken; they do care for the destiny that awaits their souls beyond the grave; and the reason is that they instinctively feel the identity with their continued existence, the reality of which they deny.

People want the restoration of their personality.—Very well; that they have.—But

no! People want their ego perpetuated. They do not care for their character, nor for their thoughts, nor for their ideals. It may be good to keep these things too; but they are unessential, for the main thing is the ego itself.

Now what is this ego, the thing that says "I"? Is it not an empty idea? which in itself is meaningless. The following passage of Schopenhauer is instructive. He says:*

"We cannot become conscious of ourselves in ourselves alone, independently of the objects of cognition and of the will. As soon as, in the attempt of doing so, we retreat upon ourselves, and direct cognition upon our interior, for the purpose of bethinking ourselves of our own self, we lose ourselves in a bottomless void and find ourselves to be like a hollow glass globe, from whose empty inside a voice proceeds the cause of which cannot be found there. While we thus try to seize ourselves, we take hold only of an unreal phantom."

Schopenhauer has apparently made experiments on himself; and endeavoring to isolate the ego, to comprehend its proper nature, and

* *World as Idea and Representation.* First German edition, II., p. 327.

see it in its absolute purity, he finds it empty like a hollow glass globe.

The same philosopher formulates in a discourse "On the Indestructible Nature of the Soul" the common view of immortality as held by an untrained mind in these words, which he puts into the mouth of a boisterous antagonist:

"But surely, my individuality, whatever it may be, is myself.

> "Naught can surpass me, replace, or supply,
> For God is God and I am I.

"I, it is I, it is myself who desire existence. My individuality concerns me, and not an existence which has first of all to be proved to me that it is mine."

In answer to this objection, Schopenhauer explains the unmeaningness of the notion "I." He says:

"But consider the matter! What is it that cries, 'I, it is I myself who desire existence,' that is, not you alone, but everything, simply everything, that has a trace of consciousness. Consequently this wish in you is precisely that which is *not* individual, but common to all without distinction. It does not spring from your individuality but from existence generally,

is essential to everything that exists, is indeed that *whereby* it exists, and will accordingly be satisfied by existence *in general* to which alone it refers, and not exclusively by any determinate personal existence. For it is not at all directed to the latter, although it always has the appearance of being so because it cannot attain to consciousness otherwise than in an individual being, and therefore always seems to have reference to such. But this is a mere illusion, to which indeed the crudity of the individual cleaves, but which reflexion can destroy and free us from."

The lowest individuals care only for their thisness, for the preservation of their bodily existence, but as they rise in the scale of evolution they begin to cherish more and more their suchness, until they reach the stage in which the body is used as the instrument of their ideals. Thus the longings for immortality, which on the lowest stages of life are coarse and carnal, become purified through a nobler and ever nobler conception of the self whose aspirations are more and more identified with the divine norms of moral goodness.

The root of our desire for immortality is the desire for self-preservation. Consequently, with a nobler conception of self our views of

immortality are naturally and inevitably purified.

Let people but feel the unison of all life and be thrilled with the grandeur of a boundless soul reaching out into eternity, and they will no longer prate of their not caring for the nobler, the truer, and the better view. They will come and drink from the fountain of life. The truth is wholesome. It will give them guidance in the vicissitudes of life, support in tribulations, and comfort in affliction.

DEATH.

Not the least important application of a comprehension of the soul in its superindividual significance will be found in our attitude toward death; for the man who has risen above his corporeal self into the realm of superindividual life can confront death with equanimity. Death appears under this aspect no longer as an annihilation; for our soul is as little wiped out as the law of causation can be suspended; death is simply the consummation of life.

Fear of Death Unnecessary.

Death is frequently feared on account of the supposed pains that it causes. A mediæval preacher impressed his audience with the terrors of death by saying:

> "Think of the pain ye suffer from a little sore on your finger; then you will understand how terrible death will be when the whole body falls into decay.'

Such a view is based on a wrong conception of the nature of death.

Fatal diseases may be painful, but death itself is not. Death is the ceasing of the sensibility which is the cause of agony, and death is therefore a release from suffering.

The dread of death that commonly prevails among mankind is the product of a morbid imagination, and quite unnecessary. Death as a dissolution of our bodily constitution has nothing terrible; it is simply a ceasing of all physiological functions, an absolute stillness of all life activities. We might as well be afraid of falling asleep as of dying. A sage of antiquity said:

"Why should we fear death? Death is not here so long as we are here; and if death is here we are no longer."

Death is no evil to the individual, but in the economy of nature it is even a boon and a blessing.

Death is the great teacher of life. Death points higher to the superindividual sphere of existence. Death teaches us to distinguish between our bodily self and the soul, between the transient and the permanent. We shall lose all fear of death as soon as we cease to identify ourselves with our corporeality. We learn that our body is like unto a tabernacle. When we are dead our remains are buried, not we: our better part survives and will not sink into the tomb.

When Crito asked Socrates, "In what way shall we bury you?" he answered:

"I cannot make Crito believe that I am the Socrates who has been talking and conducting the argument. He fancies that I am the other Socrates whom he will soon see a dead body,—and he asks how he shall bury me. . . . False words are not only evil in themselves, but they infect the soul with evil. Be of

good cheer, then, my dear Crito, and say that you are burying my body only, and do with that whatever is usual and what you think best."—Plato, *Phædo,* 115.

The old dualism which looks upon the soul as a separate entity that has been inserted into a body, is wrong, but it contains a great truth, which consists in the appreciation of the soul as the essential and abiding part of man. The human body is comparable to the paper of a book, but the soul is the thought expressed in words. The paper may be torn or burnt, but the words can be reprinted and appear in new editions. The various copies of a book will be used up; but the words will be read and remembered; they will be copied and preserved. The words are the soul of the book; they, and not the paper and printer's ink, are the book itself.

The Origin of Death.

Immortality being the corollary to the truth that we are the continuance of prior life must be regarded as the natural state and is so much a matter of course that not it, but its counterpart, death, is the real problem that

demands a solution. Life is in its evolution so much a continuity that death seems to contradict the laws of existence. Death does not exist in the realm of the lowly organised beings. Amœbas and moners grow and divide, they do not die. The mother breaks up into two daughters, but leaves no corpse behind, for the daughters are identical in structure as well as substance with the mother, only that they are two in number.

If thus immortality be the natural state of life on its lowest scale, how is it that death appears with the rise of the higher forms of life? Is not death perhaps a factor in life which is subservient to a purpose that works for good? Such in fact is the case; death appears in the scale of life as the necessary concomitant of individuality; and individuality originates with birth.*

Multiplication by division is not entirely limited to the very lowest creatures; we find it also among animals that stand comparatively high in the scale of evolution, much

* For further details see the chapter "Whence Came Death?" in *The Soul of Man*, pp. 404–407.

higher at least than the moner. Some polyps, and among them corals, multiply by division. Their mouths having the appearance of a flower, grow broader in size; the opposite edges approach each other at the median line, until they unite. Thus the two corners of the mouth are separated for good and form two corals upon one stalk.

There is a great advantage for the animalcules that come into existence through a process of multiplication by division. Every moner, every polyp thus produced starts in life as a full-fledged creature. There is no state of infancy with all its troubles and dangers to be passed through, for these creatures make their first appearance in a state of maturity. It is natural that the form and soul of the original organism should thus be preserved in all the details of their parts. The heredity of these animals is no similarity, but absolute identity.

These advantages are lost in the measure that the procreation of new individuals approaches the system of sexual generation. Buds are at first very tender and may easily

be injured before they are as strong as their mother organism. Spores are helpless and may be devoured as food by the many hungry animals that swarm about them. And the higher we rise in the scale of evolution the greater become the difficulties of a germ, of a young animal, of a baby, to reach maturity. These disadvantages to the individual, however, are richly overbalanced by the higher advantages afforded through the greater possibilities of development and progress. The struggle for life grows fiercer, yet in and through the struggle the organisms grow stronger; they adapt themselves to conditions, first unconsciously, then consciously, teaching the lessons of a higher morality than self-preservation, the ethics of parental love; and in man they acquire that foresight and circumspection which make him the lord of creation.

Death is the twin of birth. Birth and death are boundaries with which certain phases of the universal life of the race are limited; so as to give them a well-defined domain of their own, with a sovereignty of their own and a responsibility of their own, without, however,

severing them entirely from the rest of the world. It is as though nature had devised this trick to bring forth better results and spur its creatures on to use their utmost efforts in a sruggle for existence.

Those animals that survive can upon the whole succeed only by great efforts; they were not strong at the start, so they had to learn to be strong; they were unmindful in the presence of dangers, so they had to learn to be on their guard in perilous situations. In every respect they had to pass through a severe school, and every single virtue that can lead them onwards they had to acquire themselves.

Innumerable individuals, it is true, are sacrificed in the struggle for existence; yet their lives are not mere waste in the household of nature: their souls continue even so as the resistance of the conquered become part and parcel of the cause of the victor. Those who go to the wall in the struggle for existence are the martyrs of progress; and the generation of to-day lives upon the fruits of their sacrifice.

Death the Fountain of Youth.

In the evolution of mankind the fallacy of individuality as something absolute and the vanity resulting therefrom exercise a temporarily beneficial influence. There is something good even in errors and mistakes. The vanity of the ego-illusion is better than the dumb indifference of the lower forms of life which are still void of the thought of self. The ego-illusion becomes immoral only when it hinders the development of superior forms of life. In the normal course of evolution a truer conception of the soul introduces better and higher ideals which find their realisation in the moral man, who regulates his actions from considerations, not of present advantage, but of the enhancement of the life to come.

The illusion of individuality originating with birth is cured by birth's twin, death. We grow one-sided through one-sided occupations, we grow stiff-necked and vain, and become more and more incapable of ridding ourselves of the errors which we have acquired. What can we wish for better than to drop from time

to time all our prejudices and begin life over again as a fresh individual. The institution of death and birth, accordingly, is a very wholesome and beneficent arrangement. It is the fountain of youth in which our souls bathe, and through its agency alone life can bloom with an ever rejuvenescent vigor in unfading virginity.

Before the comprehension of the true nature of the soul, birth as an absolute beginning vanishes; and so does death as an absolute annihilation. We learn to recognise the intimate interconnexion of our selves with the life of the distant past as well as with the life of the ages to come. He who attains to this height lives on the summits of existence and breathes the air of immortality. His soul has risen into the domain of the superindividual life; death has no sting for him; he has conquered the ills that flesh is heir to; and he looks upon the world with the eye of divine enlightenment. In him deity has become incarnate.

ETHICS.

A wrong view of immortality will, no doubt, produce a wrong kind of ethics. The monk who looks upon bodily existence as a sin and wants to liberate the soul by destroying the body, will seek salvation in asceticism and world-flight and will probably lose the finer moral sentiment so as to become blind to the fact that the root of his religious motives is pure selfishness, and his aim is not the elevation of life but the attainment of eternal happiness in heaven. How much superior is the Buddhist who scorns to go to heaven and prefers to be reborn in the deepest hell where he can become a help to others in pointing out to them the path of salvation!*

The right view of immortality will produce a right kind of morality, and it is by its practical application that we shall prove the truth of a doctrice.

If the moments of life were not immortalised, there would be no sense either in ethics,

* See *Nirvana*, published by The Open Court Publishing Co. Japanese edition, p. 32.

or in forethought, or in sacrifice of any kind. But since the moment endures, the consideration of the future becomes the highest, the main and most important motive in life. As much as the future in its infinite duration is longer and more lasting than the present which as in the onward motion of time is but a fleeting moment, so the question of what a deed will be in the life to come is more important than what it is at present while it is being done. In the same way our after-life is of so much more gravity than our present life, and he who understands the consequence of the present for the future will never lose sight of its significance. Morality is nothing more nor less than being swayed by considerations of the life to come.

The problem of ethics is ultimately a question of psychology. Professors of ethics and preachers of morality speak much about altruism and egotism, about selfishness and unselfishness, and, as a rule, fail to explain what they mean by self. Morality is not much helped by this contrast between self and other, for morality is, at bottom, a hy-

giene of the soul. All the boons of life, all earthly blessings possess value only in so far as they sustain the life in which our soul manifests itself; and it is the soul alone which they finally serve. Ethics is not altruism; it is not serving others because they are others, nor is it a neglect of our own self. Ethics is the growth, the increase, the higher development of the soul. Charity extended to people that are unworthy is no virtue, and good-nature without circumspection is either weakness, or foolishness, or recklessness, but never a virtue. Ethics is not a neglect of self, but on the contrary a culture of self, including an expanse and preservation of its perfected form beyond the boundary of our individual sphere of being.

The goods of the world, riches, resources of wealth, food, books, instruments, means of instruction, and machinery to economise labor, possess worth only because they contribute directly or indirectly to the enhancement of our soul. Whatever the money value of a nation's possession may be, the main capital is the minds of the people, their moral charac-

ter, their intelligence, their energy. So long as the souls of a people remain sound, we need not worry about temporal goods, for Christ's advice (if not interpreted in too narrow a sense) is truly good: "Seek ye for the kingdom of God and all these things shall be added unto you;" and the kingdom of God is within us; it is the health and enhancement of our souls.

When the Huguenots, the most prosperous part of the population of France, were expelled, they lost all their worldly goods and saved only their bare lives. But whithersoever they turned they carried with them their souls, their love of liberty, their faith, their skill, their perseverance. They soon grew prosperous again in their new homes and repaid richly the hospitality with which they had been received in Holland, Prussia, and England by the introduction of new industries and arts, which contributed not a little to the present ascendancy of all the Protestant countries. Christ says:

"What shall it profit a man, if he shall gain the

whole world, and lose his own soul? Or what shall a man give in exchange for his soul?"*

The same truth is expressed in the motto of Charles of Burgundy:

"Wealth lost, nothing lost; courage lost, much lost; honor lost, everything lost."

Only let us understand by honor, not the tinselled escutcheon, the pride and vanity of the knight-errant, but the integrity of our souls, which is true honor.

The right kind of man will survive in the struggle for existence in spite of all tribulations, persecutions, and difficulties for truth, courage, and righteousness are stronger than death and possess the power of immortalising the soul.

* * *

Whenever you doubt what course of action you should take in a given situation, I know of no better method of finding the right way than by soaring above your individuality into the superindividual realm. You can do it in various ways, three of which suggest them-

* Mark viii. 36–37.

selves as the easiest for him who still clings to concrete conditions. First he may ask himself, What advice would my father or mother give me in the present situation; secondly he may consider, what he would request his own children to do, if one of them were in his place; or thirdly, he might become clear about what he himself would wish to have done if he had died, and all the troubles of the present life had passed away. The decision reached by these methods, will probably always be the same; and if honestly obtained without any attempt at equivocation or hypocrisy may be considered as the expression of the noblest motives that slumber in the heart of man. It marks the highest height to which his soul can soar.

The higher and superindividual view of our own affairs, which regards the span of our life under the aspect of the immortalised after-life, will be characteristic of our better self, and an action done under the weight of this thought is one which, very likely, we shall never rue.

HEAVEN ON EARTH.

The character of the world is restlessness, but there is something stable in all changes. There is the immutable law which remains constant in all the transformations of being. And we can attain it and give it a home in our hearts. The vision of it is the realisation of heaven on earth.

There is truly a heaven above us; not in the sky, not somewhere among the stars, but in the spiritual realm of the eternal immutable conditions that shape the world and guide the course of events. There are laws (so called) of nature, and laws of mind, and laws of the heart. There are verities of physics, verities of logic, and verities of ethics; and all these verities are one eternal truth; namely God. God is the immutable order of all cosmic existence, being to the scientist the light of comprehension, to the man of good-will the path of righteousness, and to all the law that abideth, the law of which in no wise one jot or one tittle shall pass away. These eternalities are the everlasting logos that was in the

beginning, and is now and ever shall be without end. It is the prototype of the human soul which has been made in its image and is its incarnation. It is the home whence we come, where we find rest and anchorage in the storms of life, and whither we return, or better, where we remain when the temporal has become a matter of the past and we have shuffled off this mortal coil.

These are old truths which all the prophets of our race have seen as through a glass darkly, and when we now see them face to face and know them as we are known, without the tinsel of their mythological dress, they remain as true as ever.

Wordsworth says:

"Our birth is but a sleep and a forgetting.
The soul that rises with us, our life's star,
Hath had elsewhere its setting
And cometh from afar.
Not in entire forgetfulness,
And not in utter darkness,
But trailing clouds of glory, do we come
From God who is our home."

IS LIFE WORTH LIVING?

OPTIMISM AND PESSIMISM.

THE question, "Is Life Worth Living," has been answered again and again, in the affirmative as well as in the negative. But on both sides the arguments have been, as a rule, of a personal nature, and have appealed to human instincts, such as the will to live, the enjoyment of existence, the desire for self-preservation, the surplus of pleasure over pain. Optimists claim that the satisfaction of our instincts is possible, and that therefore, upon the whole, and neglecting exceptional cases of extraordinary ill luck, life *is* worth living. Pessimists, on the other hand, do not recognise the validity of this argument, but declare that our wants are unending. The satisfaction of one want begets innumerable new wants; therefore, there is no escape from pain, from danger, from fear of disaster and

death; in fact, life being a constant oscillation between wants and their satisfaction, we have the choice only between *ennui* and pain, while the pleasures of existence are mostly illusory. Not without good reason are they compared to the bloom of flowers and fruit, or to the iridescence of the butterfly's wing, which disappears at the mere touch of our hand and preserves its enamel hue only so long as it is not too closely inspected.

But even if enjoyment were in itself of a more solid character, its worth is of a doubtful nature, because it is fleeting. There is no permanence in it; it is transient.

Transiency is the ultimate argument of pessimism. And there is no gainsaying it. Time is the form of existence, and time is the great leveller which renders all our efforts nugatory. Time calls into existence kingdoms of great power, and crumbles them into dust. Time witnesses the furtive joys of revellers, and his stern glance silences their boisterous songs. It makes flowers wither and rosy cheeks grow pale. It shapes the stars in their fiery beauty, and decks the surface of planets

with vegetation and life; but light changes into darkness, and animation sinks back into death, leaving moon-like landscapes, desolate, dead deserts of cold grandeur.

YEARNING FOR ETERNITY.

Religion comes to our rescue and points out a goal which promises to give significance to the transiency of life, encouraging us to

> ". . . let our souls on wings sublime
> Rise from the vanities of time,
> Draw back the parting veil and see
> The glories of eternity."

Truly, nothing short of the abolition of time—the attainment of eternity—can take away the curse of the transiency of life and deprive death of its sting. But is the attainment of eternity possible, and is not the idea itself an illusion?

There is a thoughtful legend which is told by the Menomini Indians, of a large conical bowlder near Wolf River, about three miles northwest of Keshena, Wisconsin. "A party of Indians once called on Mänäbush* to ask

* Mänäbush (literally "the big rabbit") is the chief deity of the Menominis.

for favors, and all of them were accommodated save one, who had the temerity to ask for eternal life. Mänäbush, it is related, took this man by the shoulders and thrust him upon the earth, saying, 'You shall have everlasting life,' whereupon he instantly became a rock. This rock, on account of its flesh-like tint, is believed to be the remains of the unfortunate Indian, who has now become a manido [that is, a spirit]. It is the custom of all passing Indians to deposit at the base of the rock a small quantity of tobacco.''*

Life everlasting means death. Life is motion, growth, transformation, change. Take away change, and life ceases.

Certainly, the conception of a heaven, of a Paradise, of a millennium, here on earth or above the sky, of a new Jerusalem, of the Isles of the Blest, or Happy Hunting-grounds, or whatever name may have been given to an existence of undisturbed bliss, is a dream, a mirage, a will-o'-the-wisp. It is an air castle built upon self-contradictory premises, and

Annual Report of the Bureau of American Ethnology, 1892–1893, I., pp. 38–39.

its foundation is empty nothingness. The critique of the pessimist as to the nugatoriness of existence applies with full force to the notion of a life of everlasting happiness in Heaven,—an existence which is without pain, without tears, without decay, without death. The very idea of a beginning without end, of time without transiency, of a continued satisfaction without wants, of rejoicings without fears, of smiles and laughter without tears, of inspirations without expirations, of life without death, of joy without pain, is self-contradictory; but even if it were not, it would become a desert of the most desolate *ennui*, and in the unchanged sweetness of eternal bliss we should soon long for bitter experiences as a relief from an intolerable monotony of celestial happiness. The mythology of Heaven affords us no escape from the curse of time; for an unending time is not yet eternity; it is still time, and every moment of it is transient, while that which becomes permanent in time, or everlasting, loses the zest of existence, and crystallises into dead rocks.

THE ETERNAL IN THE TRANSIENT.

All life that is in time, be it ephemeral, as short as a few years, a day or an hour, or everlasting, infinitely long, falls under the same category, and is in the same predicament. There is no escape from its being transient.

But though the conception of a localised heaven be wrong, in which the allegories of eternity are painted in temporal imagery, we need not reject the idea of eternity itself as contradictory.

Existence as it is actualised in material concreteness is constantly shifting and changing, and life is a motion that never and nowhere remains the same. But there are conditions which determine the kaleidoscopic display of the world; there are factors that underlie the formation of things which suffer no change, and continue in their identity. They are now as they were in the beginning and ever shall be, without end. They are formulated by scientists under the name of

Laws of Nature, because in nature they become manifest.

But the laws of nature are one aspect only of these factors of existence. Another aspect presents itself to the mathematician who develops them as forms of pure thought, without resorting to sense-experience, simply by internal and purely mental experimenting. Mathematical truths are not single facts, not concrete material things, and yet they are realities. They are not bodily realities, like stones; they are spiritual realities; they are not here alone, nor there alone, but here and there. They are omnipresent and universal. They are not now alone, and not anon alone; they are both now and anon; they are independent of time; they are eternal; they would remain true, even though the whole temporal display of the world-forces had never taken place; they are intrinsically necessary. But as such they are superreal and of greater importance than isolated objects and individual beings.

Mathematical truths are kin to natural laws, and natural laws will ultimately be found

to be applications of mathematics to special conditions.

The omnipresent and eternal verities which can be formulated as natural laws are the key to the world-mysteries. They are to the scientist the ultimate explanations of existence, containing the *raisons d'être* of the suchness of things, why in every instance, under given conditions, an object or an event or a fact of any kind must be such as it is. But to the man of affairs, the architect, the organiser, the builder and master-workman, they are the factors of every new formation and creation. They shape the world and mould it, and thus while they themselves are above time, they yet permeate everything temporal, and condition it. Embodied in sentient creatures, they become the organ of cognition, constituting those faculties which are typically human in man.

THE PROTOTYPES OF EXISTENCE.

Mathematical truths are only one instance of the whole group of formative factors, for there are also moral and physical prototypes.

Though they cannot as easily and simply be formulated as mathematical truths, they are neither less real nor less important.

Ideas, as Plato called the prototypes of existence, are unmaterial; they are purely spiritual; they have nothing to do with sense or sensibility; they are neither perceivable by the senses nor are they themselves endowed with sensation; they are purely mental; they can be grasped by the mind only. Nor are they concrete beings, but general presences; not individual objects, but universal truths.

We become familiar with a good many of these truths in school, and familiarity breeds contempt. We accept them as our methods for acquiring knowledge. They serve for calculating the debts which we owe to others or others owe to us. But the same rule of three which adjusts our trivial business relations with our neighbors unlocks the mysteries of the starry heavens. There is ethics in the multiplication table, and a reflexion of divine omniscience resides in mathematics. Indeed, our very soul is the embodiment of a collection of exactly such truths, for reason—human

reason—is nothing but an incarnation of the logic of experience. Reason is the practical operation of the most common rules of the formal sciences. Reason has originated by experience, and is in its rude form merely an instinct called "common sense"; but it can be refined and developed by critique and method, which being done, it is called "science."

But, as there are natural laws of gravity and chemistry, so there are natural laws of human conduct. Causation holds good in the physical as well as in the moral domain, and as the former develops common sense, so the latter does conscience. Conscience, too, is an instinct; it has developed naturally, and is the product of experience; it is partly inherited, partly transmitted to us by example and education, and partly acquired by personal experience. Conscience needs the finishing touches of methodical refinement as much as does common sense, for while the conscience of man, if honestly consulted, is upon the whole marvellously reliable, we cannot deny that there are erring consciences, and sometimes

whole generations in history have gone astray and done wrong—for conscience' sake.

As Reason is a witness to the existence of those spiritual factors of existence which have shaped the world in the course of its evolution, so the existence of conscience indicates that there is, in the domain of the superreal, a certain something that corresponds to our moral ideals. We might formulate it as moral laws of nature, and they are as much formative factors of existence, and especially of society, as are the laws of gravitation and chemical affinity.

Here, accordingly, we have a realm that does not partake of the transiency of time—a realm of spiritual presences, a superreal realm which is the law and norm of the real world of material existence. Man's soul is a more or less perfect comprehension of some of these truths, and the worth of a man consists in the way in which he practically applies them.

MAN'S FRAVASHI.

According to the Zoroastrian doctrine, every man possesses a fravashi, an ideal pro-

totype of himself; and this fravashi is as much a superreal factor as are all other spiritual presences, such as mathematical rules and logical truths. And if the fravashi of a man is represented as his guardian spirit, we have a deep philosophical truth clad in the garb of mythology. Man's life is an actualisation, *ein Darleben*, of his ideal self, and in and with it he partakes of eternity.

The idea of a fravashi is not exclusively Zoroastrian, for other religions, too, propose doctrines of a pre-existence. Buddha resides in the Tusita Heaven, and when the time comes descends in the shape of a white elephant—the symbol of love—into the womb of his mother, Mâyâ Devî. He enters the material world, not as a perfect Buddha, but as a Bodhisatva, a bodhi-seeker, an aspirer for Buddhahood, and thus grows to be his fravashi. He fulfils the mission of his ideal.

Nor is the idea of pre-existence missing in Christianity. Jesus says to the Jews: "Before Abraham was, I am," which sentence is commonly interpreted as a pre-existence in the sense of Platonic ideas. The Logos is the

eternal prototype of Christ; it is the all-comprehensive idea in its moral significance, it is the eternal ought—and Christianity teaches that Jesus is the incarnation of the Logos.

Not Christ alone, but every man, has his prototype,—an ideal that constitutes his fravashi. Nay, all creation is in the same predicament. Animals are realisations of certain types; and even things, from the simplest crystal to the most complicated steam engine, are actualisations of potentialities, whose natures are determined according to intrinsic laws, constituting the eternal norms of being.

To sum up, then, life is transient, but man's soul is the effulgence of a light that is eternal.

THE FABRIC OF SPIRIT-LIFE.

Every event that takes place has the roots of its being in the universe; it is part and parcel of the entire All, and the whole, with its general laws as well as its special causes, is reflected in every particular happening. In other words, the coöperation of all the forces of the cosmos are needed to produce every

special incident, and every special incident on becoming a matter of the past enters into the fabric of causation as one of the factors that are to determine the future.

This is true of all things and finds its special application in the life of mankind. The conditions of every single individual, the factors that make him what he is and determine his being, existed before him, and the result of his life becomes even after his death an indelible presence in the history of mankind. Thus it appears that the life of every one of us is a segment of time set like a diamond in a gold ring on the face of eternity. Every personality is of unique individuality; it is of a particular suchness different from all the rest; but it is after all of universal significance, and receives its worth and dignity through its relation to the life of the whole and as a reflexion of its surroundings in their cosmic infinitude.

Viewing man as a temporal phenomenon, we have to distinguish three phases of his being: First, his pre-existence, in which his soul was not yet combined in his special per-

sonality, but prepared its appearance by flickering up in various and partial manifestations, like innumerable threads destined to be united in one knot. The bodily life of a man constitutes the second phase of his being, which is the actualisation of his prototype in a definite personality. This personality (like all events in the infinite chain of causation) is at once effect and cause. It is the product of innumerable definite factors, and it produces certain results which are rich and multiform in proportion as each special soul is active and effective during its life-time. Here begins the third phase of our existence. The threads which emerge from the node that represents our life are dyed with the tint of our personality, and it may be that in several of them our entire being in all its characteristic suchness is present.

Considered from the standpoint of each single personality, the first phase (being the phase of pre-existence) is pre-natal and merely potential; the second phase is bodily actuality; and the third phase is a purely spiritual existence.

THE REALM OF SPIRIT.

By spiritual we understand that which is of the nature of spirit, and spirit is the significance of certain forms,—especially word-combinations. The word "light," for instance, signifies certain experiences of our organs of sight, and in addition the symbolical meaning which the conception of light has come to denote by way of analogy. Word-combinations render a transference of thought possible, and thought is spirit. Every sentence is a thought; every exhortation is the expression of a will. There are evil thoughts, and there are good thoughts, and the whole world of thought is a spiritual realm.

In the spiritual realm there are spirits of all descriptions. There are strong spirits, and there are weak spirits, there are spirits of truth, and there are lying spirits. There are spirits of honesty and moral endeavor, and there are spirits of treachery and ill will.

Spirits are not ghosts. They are not beings with sublimated bodies, made of impalp-

able material, like air or ether. They do not flit about like invisible birds, lithe and winged, yet concrete and somehow substantial. Spirits are not mystical entities or mysterious beings. They are simply the meaning of words or other thought-symbols, and being such they are the most important feature of existence. They rise into existence, as it were, from nothingness with the rise of sentient life, and become at once the center of existence, its end and aim, supplying the decisive factor that directs and guides all activities, giving purpose and significance to life.

Spirits in themselves are abstract ideas; they are born of circumstances, through the wants of sentient beings. They constitute the minds of living creatures. On assuming definite shape in words or other thought-symbols they are transferable from one mind to other minds, and one idea may take possession of hundreds, of thousands, of millions of people.

There are sentences that will electrify multitudes and even whole nations. Such sentences must correspond with established thought-forms expressive of special senti-

ments. Sentiments, wherever they prevail, may be awakened by their watchwords. Thus, the clamor for liberty, right or wrong, always finds an echo in the hearts of men. We then say: The spirit of liberty takes possession of the people. There are other spirits,—the spirit of restlessness, the spirit of disorder, the spirit of rebellion prompting men to do mischief from sheer envy or hatred. There is again the spirit of benevolence and loving-kindness making for peace and spreading good will on earth.

These spirits live in the minds of real personalities, but their significance is in the mere idea, which may be expressed in written words or monuments of art. A spirit may live in a book, which so far as its material substance is concerned is an absolutely dead object; for we must remember that a spirit is not a ghost or a mysterious being, but the significance of thought-symbols. Spirits are not material things, they are the meaning of forms whose material substratum is without importance and purely incidental. But though spirits (considered in themselves as ideas) are unma-

terial, they are not unreal. On the contrary, they constitute a higher, nobler, and more important reality than the reality of purely material facts; they are superreal, and all material life gains worth and value only as a means to support and enhance spiritual life.

Now, man is spirit, or rather spiritual. The essential part of man, that which constitutes his humanity, is his spiritual life, his soul. Man's bodily existence is merely the actualisation of his spirituality. A man is not one spirit, but a great system of spiritual activities; his soul is a place of tryst for many spirits; and these spirits are welded into a new unity in each new personality in which they meet. They are more or less modified, and they pass on to other minds with the stamp of the personality from which they proceeded. Thus, when a man dies he continues to live in the spirit, and the spiritual life of a man when abiding in many other minds may be more efficient than was his life in the flesh.

In Goethe's *Faust* the earth-spirit representing the display of life on this planet describes the evolution of mankind as the weav-

ing of the living garment of God, characterising his own activity in these lines:

> "In the tides of Life, in Action's storm,
> A fluctuant wave,
> A shuttle free,
> Birth and the Grave,
> An eternal sea,
> A weaving, flowing
> Life, all-glowing,
> Thus at Time's humming loom 't is my hand prepares
> The garment of Life which the Deity wears!"

Personalities disappear when the whole fabric is considered, but for all that they remain of paramount importance as being the centers where alone the spirit-life is pulsating with the warm glow of sentiment and sentiency. Personalities are the homes in which spirits live and multiply. We feel the power of great personalities, and we cherish them and wish to preserve them. Hence this yearning for personal immortality, which is not only legitimate, but is also satisfied in the way in which it is legitimate. The bodily life of every individual being is broken up in death, but the personality and its significance are not lost. The threads which have entered into it emerge

from it and continue. Nay, more than that, the personality of the deceased himself is superadded as a new spiritual element, the importance of which depends upon the intrinsic worth of his life.

It is obvious that the world is different before and after the life of every one of us, and the question in each single case is only whether or not the world is better for our having lived in it.

But what is the use of all this glorious display of spiritual life for the several personalities themselves? Considering all the ills that flesh is heir to and remembering that the strength of a noble life is after all only labor and sorrow, we ask ourselves, Is life worth living?

IS LIFE WORTH LIVING?

As to the question, Is life worth living? we grant that there is a good deal of truth in the answer which a punster made, who said: "All depends upon the liver." Whether or not your life is worth living depends upon your way of living, and the answer, howso-

ever you may formulate it, is an expression of your attitude in life.

The question, Is life worth living? is not rightly stated, for obviously the life of some people *is* worth living, and the life of others *is not*. The question should be: "Can life be made worth living?" and this is to be answered with an emphatic "yes." Life in itself is neither bad nor good; it becomes bad or good according to the way in which it is lived.

The optimist is wrong when he accepts life as a boon on the argument that it contains a surplus of pleasure over pain. He is like the man of the parable, who, hanging in the well a sure prey to death, forgets his plight and enjoys the honey that is within his reach. Our pleasures are as fleeting as our pains, and the worth of life is not in them.

Optimism overlooks the most salient truth of existence, the transiency of life; and from the standpoint of the pleasure-seeker the pessimist is right. Considering life in itself, the span of the individual alone in its temporal aspect, without an outlook into the eternal

that forms its radiant background, Lord Byron is right when he says:

> "Count o'er the joys thine hours have seen,
> Count o'er the days from anguish free,
> And know whatever thou hast been
> 'Tis something better not to be."

As to the worth of life, all depends upon the standpoint taken. Who are you that ask the question? Are you the body, the material particles that constitute your system at the present moment; or are you the spirit, the fravashi, which determines the nature and character of your self? Are you the clay and its sensuous activity, or are you the significance of this activity, the will—not in a Schopenhauerian sense "the blind will," but the clearness of the will—the moulding factor, that which directs and arranges, that which determines the aim and purpose of your life? Certainly, we as human beings are both in one; we are incarnations, and if we understand the superiority of the spiritual we shall not hesitate to look upon the body as secondary, as the means of a realisation of our ideal. Being incarnations we are not flesh, but the

word, the thought, the idea, become flesh. A statue is not clay, but clay moulded.

It is natural that man should become conscious of his spirituality only by degrees. So long as he is merely a sense-animal, he will cling to the sense-life of his bodily existence. Comprehending the transiency of the sensuous pleasures of the body and the significance of his spiritual life, he goes to the other extreme and conceives his spiritual existence as a ghost-soul—a kind of material essence. This is materialism spiritualised, which marks the period of dualism and pessimism in which man yearns for liberation from "this body of death." In both periods, man clings to something temporal, to a self that is limited in time and space; that is here, and not in any other place,—here where his body is, or where he feels the seat of his soul or spirit to be, and the spirit is conceived after the analogy of the body, as a bodily system consisting of a kind of sublimated substance.

In both periods, that of optimism as well as that of pessimism, the answer to the question, Is life worth living? depends solely upon

whether or not a surplus of pleasure over pain be obtainable. Both views are egoistic or individualistic in the sense that the self is regarded as a concrete, isolated being, sensuous, i. e., endowed with sensibility, and composed of a substance of some kind. When the nature of the spiritual comes to be understood as pure form, as the condition of all suchness, as the determining factors that shape existence, as the eternal norm of all temporal occurrences, we shall, without returning to the primitive, materialistic conception, appreciate the importance of our bodily life as the actualisation of our spiritual prototype, and yet need not surrender the truth of the superiority of the spiritual in us. On the contrary, we shall then understand it. We are incarnations of some type sublime that is eternal. Or, better still, because truer, we *are* the type eternal in its temporal actualisation.

BRUTE AND MAN.

The animal leads a life of mere sense-existence. The conception of its own existence

is limited to the moment, and thus the fleeting enjoyment is the sole aim it can see. It cannot rise above itself and meditate on its own nature, on the conditions that shape it, and the results which it leaves. With all due reserve, and acknowledging at the same time the deeply moral significance of the animal's instincts, we must clearly recognise that the animal does not yet possess spirituality in the full sense of the word; it is irresponsible, and has not as yet been confronted with the problem of the moral ought. It lives, but it will never be in a condition to reflect on the significance of life, or ask itself the question: Is life worth living?

Man, as long as his conception remains limited to his sensual life, is to a great extent like the brute. He has progressed beyond the brute in having acquired the rational faculty. He is, in a limited way, an incarnation of the Logos, but not yet of the ethical norm, the "ought." He may ask himself the question: Is life worth living? But his answer will be from the standpoint of egoism, according to the balance of pleasure over pain. To

the spiritual man, however, the question loses its meaning. Feeling eternity in himself, he knows that all life is the actualisation of norms that are eternal. The bodily incarnation is incomplete, and the fleeting moment insufficient. Says Goethe:

> "All things in their transiency
> But as symbols are meant."

RELIGION.

A solution of the problem, Is life worth living? is proposed in the legends of various religions. Klopstock, in the first chapter of the *Messiad*, represents God the Father and God the Son in Heaven; and God the Son, beholding the misery of sin, takes the task upon himself to set out and become flesh, saying:

> "Aye, I will be of mankind the Redeemer."

Life is a field for the display of work, and he who has risen above the conception of his self in its temporal, specific, particular isolation will take the pleasures of life as recreations only, to enable him to actualise his fravashi, the prototype of his being, his ideal.

This attitude is characterised in the legend of a Buddhist saint who on his death-bed scorns the idea of entering the state of eternal happiness with Brahma, saying: "So long as there is suffering in the world, I shall never enter upon a state of rest; I shall never desire to ascend into a heaven of bliss. I want to be reborn in the deepest depths of hell. There the misery is greatest and salvation most needed. That is the best place to enlighten those in darkness, to recover what is lost, and to point out the path to those who have gone astray."*

This is but another formulation of the truth that the fravashi of the saviour is not born in the palace, but in a stable, because there is no room for him at the inn.

The question, Is life worth living? assumes a new aspect when viewed from the higher ground of a religious and philosophical insight into the eternality of the world-order in all its glory. Life may be undesirable to the egoist; but the egoistic standpoint is purely phenomenal, implying the emptiness and shal-

* *Nirvâna*, a story of Buddhist philosophy, p. 32.

lowness of all joys. However, on account of its transitoriness we cannot as yet say that life is not worth living; and the compensation which accrues from assuming the higher ground of preferring the eternal to the temporal is greater than the loss. If our bodily existence is insufficient in itself, there is no need of turning our backs upon life and becoming misanthropic. The ethics of world-flight is wrong; for if life has no intrinsic value, it may acquire it by becoming serviceable to aims and purposes which are neither transient nor worthless.

Life has innumerable joys which are pleasant in spite of their transitory nature; at any rate, they are sufficient to make the thoughtless cling to life. A wise man will not hold them in contempt on account of their insufficiency from a higher standpoint. They retain their full value for the purpose which they serve, and become obnoxious only when they become hindrances to our spiritual growth and prevent us from understanding the deeper significance of life and the duties of the moral ought. We need not be disgusted with the

bloom of the fruit because it contains no nourishment; and we need not revile the beauty of the rainbow because it is not a granite arch. The main fault of the average man is the materialism of his expectations. He wants life and soul and spirit to be substances as thick and as clumsy as rocks and as gross and coarse as his body, and imagines that if form is the essential feature of existence, philosophy will end in nihilism.

Schiller castigates the sensualism which dominates the opinions of vast numbers of religious people in a Xenion called "The God-eaters, or Theophagi." He says:

"Oh! what gluttons! They swallow ideas to tickle their palates.
Spoons they would carry, and forks, Into the Kingdom of God."*

Theological hedonism is the secret reason of all narrowness; it is sensual to the core, and would not brook a spiritual conception of the letter of religious dogmas. The thoughtless cling to the allegory of the parable because it pleases the senses, and they scorn its spirit because the significance of the spirit

*The meter of these two lines is the Greek distich, viz., a dactylic hexameter and pentameter.

escapes them. When sensualism no longer rules supreme, the time will come when the philosophy of religion will be better appreciated.

THE ONE THING THAT IS NEEDFUL.

Let us learn that form, though not a substance, is the reality of life, it is the super-real; and the problem of ethics is not *that* we live but *how* we live. The value of life lies not in its length, not in the number of years, not in the amount of happiness attained in it; but in *the direction* in which it tends and *the purpose* which it serves. We must get our bearings in life by studying its Whence and its Whither. That is the one thing which is needful.

A true comprehension of the purpose of life points beyond the limits of the individual and teaches us the interrelation of all existence. It opens a vista behind us and before us. It shows that every individual is but the continuation of prior activities and that death is the discontinuation only of this body of death, of that which is temporal and material,

and not an annihilation of our souls, of our real self.

Life in itself is a boon only as an opportunity to perform a task, to accomplish a certain work, to actualise an ideal. The aim of life is its significance, and it alone establishes its dignity. By having an aim that is rooted in eternity, we need not mind the transiency of life. We can impart to life a significance that is beyond the intrinsic meaning of the moment, and, being the revelation of imperishable ideals, possesses a worth everlasting. The recognition of the spiritual background which transfigures our bodily life implies a lesson which is the quintessence of all religion.

"O use life's moments while they flee,
In aspect of eternity:
In acts abides the actor.
Eternity is immanent,
And life remains such as 'tis spent,
For aye a living factor;
Sowing,
Seeds growing,
Never waning
But attaining
To resplendent
Glories of the realms transcendent"

EPILOGUE.

IN REPLY TO MY CRITICS.

THIS little book was written mainly for those who have had in their lives the unpleasant experience of being beset with doubts, because confronted with problems which come to us, not by our own desire, but in the natural course of our mental growth.

The soul-problem is a religious problem, and our conception of the soul decidedly affects our religious attitude. The traditional religion does not enter at all into the theoretical difficulties of modern psychology, and inculcates only some practical results, expressed in moral rules of an altruistic ethics, which in their main sentiments no one seriously thinks of controverting. Some popular notions of the soul fill the gap, and thus it happens that those who are grounded in their faith are not

in need of the explanation and arguments here set forth; they possess a surrogate of the truth which most likely will prove sufficient for them, because adapted to their special wants; and I can even imagine that there may be circumstances under which the truth will positively hurt them. How many are there that need milk and cannot as yet stand stronger diet!

The book is addressed to those who are about to reach the age of mental maturity and suffer from doubt and other maladies that accompany the period of transition. It is destined for the sick who need medicine, for the poor in spirit who want information, for those astray who are seeking the light,—who want the truth and nothing but the truth,—those who have outgrown the infantile stage of being satisfied with creeds and have ceased to accept a statement because it is made on the authority of a book or a bishop, of a father or a teacher, or any other venerable person or body of persons, churches, or councils.

The author cherishes the conviction that the old dogmatic formulations of religion con-

tain the truth and are a natural and necessary phase in the religious evolution of mankind. They contain the truth, but they are not the truth. Creeds are symbols and are called so by the Church. They are formulations of the truth in allegorical terms. God is not a father; he is comparable to a father. It is the best simile we can find. The eternal ideal of Christhood is not a mere Word, not language, not speech, but to the Greek world the term Logos (meaning the logical order, or orderly rationality that finds expression in speech) was a most significant term; and this Logos or world-order, which is revealed in the realisation of the morally perfect man, is not God's physically begotten son, but there is no better expression than the relation between father and son to denote the significance of the Christ-idea. There are no angels with wings flitting between heaven and earth as messengers of God to men; but we are surrounded by helpful influences more efficient and more real than the beings of our own fancy. Last but not least, man's soul-life and immortality are as real on the basis of the

doctrines of a genuine psychonomy with its exacter determinations as on the simple and plain assumptions of the old-fashioned psychology.

The traditional conception of the soul may be characterised as a materialistic spiritualism, because it materialises the soul as an entity and regards it as a concrete being consisting of a sublimated substance. The theory is exploded, but the hearts of those who have no knowledge of the present state of science still hunger after the flesh-pots of the old psychological Egypt with its naïve mythology and all the crude notions implied in it.

Materialistic spiritualism is a natural and necessary phase in the history of psychological science; its most classical expression has been worked out by the Vedanta philosophy of the ancient Brahmans in essays called Upanishads which prepared the way for Buddhism.*

* The Upanishads in the form in which we now have them may have been written later and may have to be assigned to the early centuries after Buddha, but the problems themselves and the method of discussing them is pre-Buddhistic, for Buddhism is an answer to the problem, negating the existence of a soul-in-itself, a self-soul, an ego-entity, an âtman.

The Upanishads are beautiful in thought and elegant in style. But their underlying ideal is an error. The Upanishads materialise the soul, making it now no larger than the end of the thumb, now smaller than a grain of rice or a mustard-seed.

There are modern thinkers who outdo the ancient Brahmans. Some, following Leibnitz, would have the soul be a monad or an atom; others, following Herbart, would reduce it to a mathematical point, assuming it to be a center of forces or *Kraftcentrum*. We need not say that a dynamical conception of the soul is as much materialistic as one that makes of it a substance.

Buddhism denied the existence of the âtman, but Buddhism, if it were assumed to deny the existence of the soul, would be as wrong as Brahman Vedantism. The truth is that the soul exists. Our soul is our feeling, our thinking, and our willing. But there is no soul-being, no substance or material soul-entity, which does the feeling, thinking, and willing. The realities of life remain as real on the theory of being the phenomenal ap-

pearances of metaphysical entities, as they are on the theory that the metaphysical ideas are fictitious notions invented for the special purpose of comprehending the factors of soul-life as realities.

Metaphysics (if the term is understood in the traditional sense) is nothing but an hypostatisation of words. Most of these words are terms coined for representing in clear outlines certain groups of events and especially all the impalpable spiritualities, and they serve the purpose of rendering abstract ideas concrete and tangible. While metaphysical notions are fictitious, they are not quite useless; they assist us in comprehending some impalpable relations and enable us to manipulate them with facility as if they were concrete things; and they hold good if limited to that purpose.

The problem of the metaphysical existence of the soul is the old problem of unity. Unity is imposed by the thinking mind upon a conglomeration of qualities, upon a complex of forces, upon a heap of material particles. Some concrete bit of reality or group of quali-

ties is severed in thought from the rest of the world and called a crystal, a tree, a chair, a planet, a mammal, a soul. In reality, even concrete things are not stable entities; they are interrelated with the conditions under which they exist and continue to exist so long as these conditions remain. In reality everything is a part of the surrounding world, and *vice versa* the surrounding world is a part of everything. The nature of a planet is determined by the character of the solar system of which it is a part. A mammal is such because the planet on which its ancestors have lived shaped its constitution. It is moulded by its surroundings and represents the sum-total of all the inherited reactions toward them of its ancestral life.

The unity of things is never a concrete object, yet it is real. It is a fiction of the thinking mind, but it is neither an illusion nor an error. The idea of unity is justified for the purpose for which it has been invented. The invention of names and the imposition of unity upon the things named is not arbitrary. Though things are in a constant flux, coming

into existence, changing while they exist, and passing out of existence again, the combination of certain parts or forces produces a new thing, and we can very well temporarily treat their combination as if it were stable, for its totality possesses certain new features not contained in any one of its parts. When the combination is realised the thing appears. The clock is not in the pendulum, nor in the weight, nor in cogs and wheels, but originates by a complete and proper combination of all parts. The same is true of the steam-engine and the dynamo, as well as of organisms.

The type of the thing (its idea) is eternal but the realised thing is a fleeting event. The idea is perfect; it is an eternal thought of God, of the creator, of the factors that shape the world. The fleeting realisation remains insufficient. Says Goethe of Faust attaining to heaven:

"Alles Vergängliche	"All transiency
Ist nur ein Gleichniss.	But as a symbol is meant.
Das Unzulängliche,*	Earth's insufficiency
Hier wird's Ereigniss."	Here grows to event."

* *Unzulänglich* is Goethe's own word. Bayard Taylor justified in translating it by "insufficient," for *zulangen* means

The unity of man's spiritual being, his soul, is just as much a product of nature as any other event or thing in the world. We are built up of many souls and our souls in turn will be used for building up future souls.

We might depict the origin of a soul as the conflux of events by strands of lines, representing first at the moment of birth an organism endowed with dispositions which are inherited from parents, grandparents, great-grandparents, and all the other more remote ancestors. They are slightly, and more or less, modified by parental influences during the time of the mother's pregnancy. With the moment of birth new strands come in, producing not mere dispositions, but well-defined and definite impressions, concrete structures, not alone aptitudes for receiving impressions. They are simple lines indicating the simple

"to suffice." But Goethe obviously did not mean that "the insufficiency of life, of the transient phenomena of material existence, are actualised in the realm of the eternal." He meant that the insufficiencies become complete, that we have here in heaven the reality that heretofore appeared incomplete and insufficient on earth. But *zulangen* means also "to stretch forth to take, or to attain," and it is not impossible that Goethe, when speaking of *das Unzulängliche*, had in mind the notion of *das Unerlängliche*, i.e., "the unattainable."

influences during the period of babyhood, hunger and its satisfaction, sensations of sound, of light, of touch, of smell, of taste, of pain, now caused by injuries, now by wants, the mother's soothing voice, the satisfaction of wants,—then again a renewal of the want and the expectation of its satisfaction by like means. All these events leave memory-traces reawakened, when the occasion arises, by sense-impressions the same or similar in kind.

In the second year a new factor tells on the young life—language. Beginning to understand and repeat words, the infant enters upon an inheritance that comes down to him from the remote ages of the dawn of humanity. The civilisation of the century is instilled into his soul by means of expressions and by the example of manners. The child's spirit unfolds according to the pattern set by his surroundings. He now begins to distinguish himself from others and calls himself "I." It is the first dawn of consciousness. What spiritual treasures are showered upon him when fairy-tales are read to him, when he becomes acquainted with brothers, sisters, parents,

grandparents, cousins, friends! And what a vista of important considerations opens to him when he encounters hostile elements,—worries, sorrows, difficulties, cares, testing his mettle and developing courage! The school days widen his horizon and intensify the troubles of life. The lines representing the



influences of this period grow extremely complex and represent the quintessence of the souls of the greatest sages, the best teachers, the boldest heroes of mankind. Foreign languages impart a great deal of the spirit of foreign nations and a comprehension of their noblest minds. Mathematics incorporates in the mental system the maturest thoughts of

the unknown masters to whom Euclid owed his education, to Egyptian and Babylonian geometricians, to Pascal, Vega, Napier, Newton, Euler, etc. Historical lessons set before his eyes the example of the noble, the strong, the powerful. Sermons in church awaken religious reflections, and the egotistic tendency which has naturally developed with the origin of the ego-conception receives a check by the teachings of self-surrender, altruistic love, sacrifice, etc. The Christ-idea comes and the God-problem, the notion of the mysterious powers that produce the world and regulate its course.

So far the receptive function was predominant, but soon when the period of growth is complete the tables are turned. Seed-time is over and the first fruits are being harvested. The most important period begins with maturity, when the boy has become a man, the girl a woman. New longings arise with puberty and life becomes serious. The young man must make a living, and the way in which he responds to the needs of life continues to mould his character and influence his

soul. He marries and takes care of his family; he educates his children and plans for their future, until the day comes that he breaks down and dies.

We have so far only considered a diagram of lines entering into the combination of strands representing the growth of a human life; we must also contemplate the reverse of the medal. A human individual is like a living knot of strands in a large net; and every single soul is a rich fabric with wonderful patterns of a most delicate beauty and peculiar originality. Yet all is life, all glowing with sentiment and quickened with activity. As many threads as are gathered up in its make-up, so many and a few more (for the fibres live and grow and multiply) emerge from it. Every action has its reaction; and all the influences here at work are spiritual factors.

Every single soul is a unity which possesses a character of its own; it is a product of the past, having at its command the span of a life to modify the past, to correct its faults, to work out its blessings, to add to and increase

transmitted knowledge, to accomplish useful deeds and work out its own salvation in its own way. While living out its own individuality, it shapes the future and establishes itself as a new factor of life which will remain an indelible present for good or for evil, or for both, in all the generations to come. We live in our children, we live in our words, we live in our works, we live wherever we leave a trace of our being. And the spirit which animates our words, our works, and all other traces of our being, is not merely the result of our life, or the influence of our soul, but our soul itself.

The reality of the soul is not annihilated when we understand that the soul is not a substance but a spiritual presence. The religions of mankind inculcate the moral applications of the truth that man's life does not cease with death; and if the allegories in which their doctrines are popularly understood cannot be accepted in the letter, they still remain true in the spirit. There is a hell of the results of evil deeds, though it be not located underground, and there is a heaven of

the blessings of righteousness and moral endeavor, though it must not be sought beyond the skies.

The same is true of the God-idea. "There's a divinity that shapes our ends, rough-hew them how we will." That power cannot be an individuality such as are human beings, not an ideal creature, not a world-monarch, delighting in the flattery of adoration, not a physical begetter of the universe; it is more than all that. But while God is not a concrete being, he is yet possessed of a distinct character. He is not the vague idea of existence in general nor the sum-total of reality (as Pantheism represents him to be); God, being the norm of existence and the ultimate authority for conduct, is definite and his qualities can be ascertained. The conduct prescribed by God cannot be mistaken, for his dispensation is everywhere the same.

The term God is not used in science. There the very idea of God seems dispensable; and truly we need not call by the name of God the factors that shape the world, that create order, and regulate human society; yet they remain

real by whatever name we may be pleased to call them. Our scientists catch glimpses of it when they formulate natural laws and our moralists when they preach righteousness and good will. Even the atheist helps to understand God better by forcing the unthinking believer to revise his notion of God and eliminate mythological features.

The unity of the world-order is real, its wholesomeness and goodness are true; why not call it God? True, it differs in many respects from the popular God-conception, but at bottom it is the same idea purified of popular misconceptions in the furnace of science. It changes a mythological God into the true God, recognising him as the superpersonal divinity of the cosmic world-order, the Eternal, the Everlasting, the Omnipresent, the All-embracing, the Supreme Norm of Existence in whom we all live and move and have our being.

Now, it is a fact that scientific progress is not at all welcome in religious fields. Our religious sentiments are so intimately interwoven with the symbolism of our creeds that

we hate to see them touched. We cling to the word, not to the sense, we quarrel over letters and ignore their significance; and it is perhaps well (or at least inevitable) that in the dogmatic period we exaggerate the importance of the symbol, for we do not as yet understand its meaning. The symbol in that period is all we possess of truth, and, the symbol gone, we would be apt to lose its meaning.

Science always appears to the religious believer as a power of destruction. The language of science is dry and cold and purely spiritual, the style of religious symbolism is poetic and sensual. It appeals to our imagination and pleases childlike natures. No wonder that the mass of mankind, being sensual and being in need of sensual imagery, shrink from the serene grandeur of science and condemn its truths as empty abstractions. It is a sign of mental immaturity to be blind to the beauty and reality of truth in the stern formulation of abstract statements; but the method of abstract thought is not at fault and

there is no reason to rebuke or censure science.

Those of my critics to whom the abstract thought of science is empty, I should vituperate as little as I would blame children who prefer fairy-tales to mathematical theorems. The value of the latter will dawn upon some of them, by no means upon all of them, in later life; and the beauty of the former, of fairy-tales, will not fade, though their importance may be eclipsed by the brighter light of genuine truth. Their all-sufficiency only will be lost in the breadth of a scientific comprehension of the situation.

What then would be the use of quarrelling with critics from the ranks of orthodox Christianity? From their own standpoint they are right, and that another standpoint may be forced upon them in due time they are incapable of comprehending. God bless them in their faith! Their faith is the best surrogate of truth they can have. They have the religion to which their mental size is adapted, and (though I believe in progress and mental growth) I have come to the conclusion that

every one's religion is shaped by his needs on the basis of his insight. Accordingly every one has the religion he deserves to have.

There are critics outside the pale of churches who find fault with my book on other grounds. They speak of it as disappointing and contradictory. On the one side the materialists, who deny the reality of ideas and everything ideal, think that I merely play with words when I insist on the truth of immortality. Because I reject the letter of the traditional dogma and the popular conception of the soul, they would prefer to have me say that there is no soul and consequently no immortality worth talking about. On the other hand there are believers in spiritual substances who think that I overlook important considerations which are apt to indicate the existence of a soul-entity. The existence of the soul as form means nothing to them, and a purely spiritual immortality is branded as the denial of any immortality, as much so as the worship in spirit and in truth appeared to be an abolition of all true worship to those

who still believed in sacrifices upon an altar reeking with blood.

With critics of this stamp I will not quarrel; but I have to add, they are wrong as to facts. The materialists are wrong in identifying man with the heap of material atoms of which he happens to consist at a given moment, and the spiritualists in conceiving the soul as a substance.

Man is the form of his life, the suchness of his existence, the character of his being. At the moment of death man's body ceases to be himself and turns into his remains,—a corpse, lifeless, void of sentiment, stark and cold like a clod, with nothing human except a reminiscence of his external shape which only serves to render it more awful and offensive to behold. The carcass is no longer the man, it is offal, it is that which has been rejected, corresponding to the slough of the snake, being the waste products of life. But, says the materialist, if the corpse is not the man, then he has disappeared and nothing is left. I agree with the materialist on his own standpoint: nothing material, no bodily corporeal-

ity, is left of the man that has died. But I add, the main part of the man remains. It is not as if the man had never been. The essential features of his life continue and act as a real and indelible presence, a formative factor of a definite description, in the general evolution of life, helping in its own way to shape the affairs of the world.

So materialistic is man by nature, having received his first education in the school of the senses, that he wants substance not form, quantity not quality, amounts and masses not character.

Hâji Abdû Al-Yasdi,* the agnostic poet, exclaims in the *Kasidah, a Lay of the Higher Life:*

> "What see we here? Forms, nothing more!
> Forms fill the brightest, strongest eye.
> We know not substance; 'mid the shades,
> Shadows ourselves we live and die."

He takes substance as real and form as a mere shade, while in fact substance is nothing but material, and there is nothing of value that is not constituted by form.

Forms are the realities of life; forms alone

* A *nom de plume* of Sir Richard F. Burton.

possess significance. Character, morality, ideals, have their conditions in the domain of form; all work, all aspiration, all endeavor, is in its very nature formative. Let us rejoice then that forms are real and that the forms of our own being are preserved in the evolution of life.

Spiritualists, on the other hand, as the name is usually understood, are the exact inverse of the materialists. While materialists deny the reality of the spiritual, because it is not material but finds expression in form, the spiritualists, convinced of the reality of the spiritual, imagine that it must or ought to have a material existence. They are, in this respect, like the materialists that think whatever is real must be a substance of some kind. Spiritual substances may be as much more refined and sublimated as air is thinner than clods of clay, but they are after all assumed to be substances or entities. They have not as yet seriously investigated the nature of the spiritual and think of it in terms of gaseous bodies or ethereal action. Hence the important rôle that, as a rule, electricity plays in

the minds of spiritualists. They speak of thought-waves and conceive them after the analogy of electric phenomena as being transmitted through the ether in the form of undulations. Such theories in explaining mind-reading and thought-transference are quite ingenious, but they are based upon a conception of spirit which materialises the spiritual.

Materialistic and spiritualistic critics agree in this, that they regard my terms and expressions as misleading or even contradictory. They think that I should consistently deny the existence of the soul and its immortality. They only prove that they have not understood the author's meaning, for the comprehension of which a certain mental training is indispensable. Those who have not as yet faced the difficulty (or better, the impossibility) of thinking the soul as a substance or an entity, will naturally think that all the trouble is vain which I take to prove that the soul (though not an entity) does truly and really exist.

Spiritualists think that I have overlooked certain considerations which in their opinion

are apt to prove the existence of a soul-entity, and claim that there is much more to be accounted for than is dreamt of in my philosophy. Some would even advise me to consult mediums and be better posted on occultism. Perhaps I know more about it than they think. Certainly, my booklet does not exhaust the subject: there are additional problems to be investigated, and the solution of the problem of the nature of the soul leads to other problems which I have not ventured to touch; but for that reason my critics may be assured that I have considered all the arguments which they refer to.

One of my critics, referring to the passage in the preface (p. v) that "there is as little need for the psychologist to assume a separate soul-being . . . as there is for the meteorologist to assume a wind-entity which by blowing produces a commotion in the air," adds:

"Obviously the cases are not parallel. The true argument would be that just as there are no air functions (or commotions of air) without the air which moves, so there can be no soul-functions without the soul."[1]

[1] Published in *The Guardian*, May 15, 1901, p. 658.

To be sure, there are conditions in which the soul manifests itself; there is a material world of action and reaction, there is a bodily substratum for the display of mental activities. But as the air is not the wind, so neither the bodily conditions nor any assumed sublimated and hypothetical substratum can be called the soul. Wind is a commotion of air, so soul is the character of feeling, of thinking, of willing, of doing. Our soul is a complex organism produced by definite conditions, and the sum-total of its functions is the soul itself. If that statement is, as my sapient critic claims, "equivalent to the denial of the existence of the soul," he ought to say that a mechanic who explains the mechanism of a watch as a certain combination of its parts which makes it perform the work of indicating the time, practically denies the existence of the watch.

My critic of course still cherishes the ideas of a materialistic spiritualism which compares the soul to a body and its manifestations to physical functions, only that the soul-body is supposed to consist of a sublimated spiritual substance, the nature of which is and will ever

remain a profound mystery. Obviously he has never in his life faced the difficulties of the soul-problem; he is fed on the husks of mythology and is satisfied with the food adapted to his stomach. He has nothing to learn from me. No wonder that he "cannot conceive of the person who would be wiser for the perusal of the book."

I grant to my critic that I frequently attach to terms and words a new meaning which departs from the traditional definition; but I do so on purpose and because I believe myself entitled to do so. I follow in this practice the common method of all thinkers, only I avoid equivocation by carefully indicating the new significance of the old terms. I might as well have discarded the entire old nomenclature and invented a new one, but I fear that no one will take the trouble to study a new conception of the soul if he has to forget the history of psychology and turn over a new leaf. Scientists never discard the old terms, but pour new wine into old bottles by giving a new interpretation to the traditional expressions.

Just as the soul was conceived by former psychologists as a soul-being, so the fire was said to be a fire-entity, a phlogiston, which manifested itself in certain functions, such as heat and light. But the idea of fire as a phlogiston has been surrendered, and yet our physicists do not say that fire does not exist. They believe as much as ever that fire burns; then, why shall I not be entitled to continue to say that the soul is real, and that the soul-functions constitute the soul, although I have reached the point in my mental development in which I have learned to understand that there is as little a soul-entity as there is a fire-stuff or phlogiston. I gladly forgive my astute critic the severity and the high-handed self-sufficiency with which he disposes of me, for he knows no better, and the ability to judge of a scientific conception of the soul is not given him. Privately he may be, and in fact I trust that he is, a dear old soul of a theologian who has preached many a good sermon to the edification of his parishioners. I have too much of the theologian in me, having myself passed through the phase in which

he tarries, not to appreciate his zeal for the truth, i. e., for the truth as he sees it.

Theology has become progressive of late. It has become an historical science in its biblical studies, and it will become philosophy in its dogmatology, and a branch of natural science in psychology and ethics.* I confess that I am a theologian, and my endeavor is to dig down to the bedrock of fact upon which theology as a science can find a safe foundation.

The immortality-conception advocated in *Whence and Whither* has one advantage which cannot be underrated. It is true and can be proved upon strict scientific evidence. It may not be satisfactory to those who believe they are in need of a soul-entity, who think that if their soul does not consist of a substance they can have no soul at all and their immortality would be a flimsy makeshift: but they cannot say that it is untrue. They cannot deny that our soul is actually formed first by the inheritance of dispositions and then through educa-

* See the author's article "Theology as a Science" in *The Monist* for 1902, Vol. XII., No. 4, and Vol. XIII., No. 1.

tion under the formative influence of other souls. Nor can it be gainsaid that in our recollections and reminiscences the souls of the dead remain living presences exercising a powerful influence upon our lives. In this sense they become angels, i. e., spiritual guides, whose inspirations have proved to be of the greatest importance. The dead have finished their career; their course is run, and all their troubles are over. Theirs is a condition of Paradisian bliss and peace. Yet their usefulness is not gone: they continue to surround us and to comfort us, and we deem the sentiment, as expressed in many Church hymns and poems, full of assurance of an immortality, not only legitimate but even perfectly tenable from our own radical standpoint; for instance, the consolation which Mr. Bonney (the well-known inaugurator of the Religious Parliament of Chicago) offers in the following words to a friend on the death of his wife:

> "And thy remaining days
> Shall not be darker for her absence here,
> But brighter for her smile from paradise." *

* Cf. *The Open Court*, February, 1902, Vol. XVI., p. 120.

One thought will gain upon the reader who has made the new conception of the soul and its immortality his own: that it is not less noble and religious nor less replete with emotional power than any one of the older views. On the contrary, unadorned by the tinsel crowns of fairy-tale royalty, a mere summary of undeniable facts, it will shine forth in the simple grandeur of plain truth, and its beauty will be recognised as intrinsic and therefore unfading and eternal.

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